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Abstract
Document similarity has important real life applications such as finding du-
plicate web sites and identifying plagiarism. While the basic techniques such
as k-similarity algorithms have been long known, overwhelming amount of
data, being collected such as in big data setting, calls for novel algorithms
to find highly similar documents in reasonably short amount of time. In
particular, pairwise comparison of documents sharing a common feature,
necessitates prohibitively high storage and computation power. The wide
spread availability of cloud computing provides users easy access to high
storage and processing power. Furthermore, outsourcing their data to the
cloud guarantees reliability and availability for their data while privacy and
security concerns are not always properly addressed. This leads to the prob-
lem of protecting the privacy of sensitive data against adversaries including
the cloud operator.
Generally, traditional document similarity algorithms tend to compare all
the documents in a data set sharing same terms (words) with query docu-
ment. In our work, we propose a new filtering technique that works on plain-
text data, which decreases the number of comparisons between the query set
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and the search set to find highly similar documents. The technique, referred
as ZOLIP algorithm, is efficient and scalable, but does not provide security.
We also design and implement three secure similarity search algorithms
for text documents, namely Secure Sketch Search, Secure Minhash Search
and Secure ZOLIP. The first algorithm utilizes locality sensitive hashing tech-
niques and cosine similarity. While the second algorithm uses the Minhash
Algorithm, the last one uses the encrypted ZOLIP Signature, which is the
secure version of the ZOLIP algorithm.
We utilize the Hadoop distributed file system and the MapReduce parallel
programming model to scale our techniques to big data setting. Our experi-
mental results on real data show that some of the proposed methods perform
better than the previous work in the literature in terms of the number of
joins, and therefore, speed.
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I˙C¸I˙N
VERI˙MLI˙ VE GU¨VENLI˙ BENZERLI˙K HESAPLAMA
Mahmoud Alewiwi
Bilgisayar Bilimi ve Mu¨hendislig˘i
Ph.D. tez, 2015
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O¨zet
Doku¨manlar arasında benzerlik arama is¸leminin gerc¸ek hayatta tekrar-
layan web sayfalarını ya da intihalleri bulmak gibi o¨nemli uygulama alanıları
vardır. Her ne kadar k-benzerlik algoritması gibi temel teknikler literatu¨rde
uzun zamandır mevcut olsa da, o¨zellikle c¸ok bu¨yu¨k boyutlardaki verilerle
c¸alıs¸manın gerekli oldug˘u bu¨yu¨k veri uygulamalarında bu tu¨r basit teknikler
yavas¸ ve yetersiz kalırlar. O¨zellikle doku¨manları ikili olarak bir ortak ter-
imi ic¸eriyor mu diye kars¸ılas¸tırmak c¸ok yu¨ksek depolama ve hesaplama gu¨cu¨
gereksinimleri dog˘urur. Bulut bilis¸imin hızla yaygınlas¸ması, kullanıcıların
bu ihtiyac¸larına cevap vermektedir. Veriyi bu tu¨r bulut servis sag˘layıcılar
u¨zerinden paylas¸mak, verinin eris¸ilebilirlig˘ini garanti etse de, verinin mahremiyeti
ve gizlilig˘i garanti edilemez. Bu durum, o¨zellikle hassas verilerin mahremiyetini
koruma problemini ortaya c¸ıkarmıs¸tır.
Geleneksel doku¨manlar arası benzerlik bulma algoritmaları c¸og˘unlukla
sorgulanan doku¨manı veri tabanındaki dig˘er tu¨m doku¨manlarla kars¸ılas¸tırmayı
gerektirir. Bizim o¨nerdig˘imiz sistemde ise, ac¸ık (s¸ifrelenmemis¸) metin verileri
u¨zerinde gerekli olan kars¸ılas¸tırma sayısını o¨nemli oranda azaltan yeni bir fil-
treleme teknig˘i kullanımı o¨nerilmis¸tir. Bu sistem ac¸ık veriler u¨zerindeki ben-
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zerlik kars¸ılas¸tırmalarında verimli olarak c¸alıs¸maktadır ve o¨lc¸eklenebilirdir,
ancak bir gu¨venlik sag˘lamaz.
Bu sistemin yanı sıra, mahremiyeti de sag˘layacak u¨c¸ gu¨venli benzer-
lik arama algoritması da (Secure Sketch Search, Secure Minhash Search
ve Secure ZOLIP) tasarlanmıs¸tır. Bunlardan ilki doku¨manlar arasındaki
kosinu¨s benzerlig˘ini konum hassasiyetli o¨zu¨tleme (locality sensitive hashing)
teknikleri kullanarak yapar. I˙kinci yo¨ntem MinHash algoritmalarını kul-
lanırken u¨c¸u¨ncu¨su¨ ise daha o¨nce ac¸ık metinler ic¸in tasarladıg˘ımız ZOLIP
imzalarının s¸ifrelenmis¸ hallerini kullanarak benzerlik hesaplaması yapar.
O¨nerdig˘imiz yo¨ntemleri gerc¸eklerken bu¨yu¨k veriler ic¸in de o¨lc¸eklenebilir
olması ic¸in, Hadoop dag˘ıtık dosya sistemleri ve MapReduce paralel program-
lama modelinden yararlanıyoruz. Gerc¸ek veriler u¨zeride yaptıg˘ımız deneyler,
o¨nerilen yo¨ntemlerin bazılarının literatu¨rde var olan dig˘er sistemlerden daha
az sayıda birles¸tirme/kars¸ılas¸tırma is¸lemine ihtiyac¸ duydug˘unu, ve dolayısıyla
daha hızlı oldug˘unu go¨stermis¸tir.
vii
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Big data, referring to not only the huge amount of data being collected, but
also associated opportunities, has big potential for major improvements in
many fields from health care to business management. Therefore, there is
an ever-increasing demand for efficient and scalable tools that can analyze
and process immense amount of, possibly unstructured, data, which keeps
increasing in size and complexity.
Finding similarities (or duplicates) among multiple data items, or docu-
ments, is one of the fundamental operations, which can be extremely chal-
lenging due to the nature of big data. In particular, similarity search on
a huge data set, where the documents are represented as multi-dimensional
feature vectors, necessitates pair-wise comparisons, which requires the com-
putation of a distance metric, and therefore can be very time and resource
consuming, if not infeasible.
However, complexity of establishing such a powerful infrastructure may
be costly or not available especially for small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs). Cloud computing offers an ideal solution for this problem. The
currently available cloud services can provide both storage and computation
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capability for massive volumes of data. This motivates us to find new and
efficient document similarity searching algorithms that can work in big data
setting utilizing cloud computing.
While data outsourcing to cloud is a feasible solution for many organi-
zations the fact that the outsourced data may contain sensitive information
leads to privacy breaches [2, 3]. Secure processing of outsourced data opera-
tions require protection of the confidentiality of both the outsourced data and
the submitted queries. Moreover, it also requires to maintain the confiden-
tiality of the patterns such as different accesses/queries aiming to retrieve
the same data. Encryption of data prior to outsourcing may provide the
confidentiality of the content of the data. However, the classical encryption
methods do not provide even simple operations over the ciphertext.
In our work, we first concentrate on finding similar documents over data
sets in plaintext using an efficient algorithm, which utilizes a new filtering
technique and cosine similarity between two documents. Then, we propose
secure search algorithms that aim to find similar documents without revealing
sensitive data.
1.1 Motivations
While the basic techniques such as k-similarity algorithms have been long
known, overwhelming amount of data, being collected such as in big data
setting, calls for novel algorithms to find highly similar documents in reason-
ably short amount of time. In particular, pairwise comparison of documents’
features, a key operation in calculating document similarity, necessitates pro-
hibitively high storage and computation power.
Finding similarities (or duplicates) among multiple data items, or docu-
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ments, is one of the fundamental operations, which can be extremely chal-
lenging due to the nature of big data. In particular, similarity search on
a huge data set, where the documents are represented as multi-dimensional
feature vectors, necessitates pair-wise comparisons, which requires the com-
putation of a distance metric, and therefore can be very time and resource
consuming, if not infeasible.
A commonly used technique, known as filtering, decreases the number
of pairwise comparisons by skipping the comparison of two documents if
they are not potentially similar; e.g., they do not share any common feature.
Also, representation, storage, management and processing of documents play
an important role in the performance of a similarity search method. A dis-
tributed file system and a parallel programming model such as MapReduce [4]
are necessary components of a scalable and efficient solution in big data ap-
plications.
From security perspective, secure data mining operations require protec-
tion of the confidentiality of both the outsourced data along with its index
that allows searching capability and the submitted queries. Moreover, it also
requires to maintain the confidentiality of the search and access patterns such
as different accesses/queries aiming the same data. Data encryption before
outsourcing may provide the confidentiality of the content of the data. How-
ever, classical encryption methods do not allow even simple operations over
the ciphertext. In the past few years several solutions have been proposed for
efficient search operations over encrypted data utilizing a searchable index
structure that accurately represents the actual data without revealing the
sensitive information.
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1.2 Contributions
This thesis focuses on the general problem of detecting the k-most similar
documents for a given (set of) document(s). It presents four novel algorithms:
i) one algorithm for unprotected document sets aiming fast and a scalable
search operation based on filtering and ii) three algorithms for secure search
operation utilizing various encryption techniques. In the first algorithm,
where the search is performed over plaintext data, two cases are considered:
i) finding k-most similar documents for each document within a given data
set (self join), and ii) finding k-most similar documents for each document
in one set from the other set (R-S join), for instance query set and data set.
In secure search algorithms, only R-S join is considered as self join is not
feasible due to the large sizes of data set used in the experiments.
The contributions of this thesis as well as the techniques employed are
summarized as follows:
• We propose an efficient document similarity algorithm that search for
document similarity over plaintext data sets.
• We utilize Z-order and propose a Z-order prefix filtering technique to
enhance the efficiency of the algorithm.
• We utilize term frequency-inverse document frequency (tf-idf) as a term
relevancy score for weight or importance of a term/word of a document.
• We use cosine similarity metric to find similarity between documents
whenever it is possible.
• We also propose several approaches that enable enhanced security prop-
erties such as search and access pattern privacy and document and
query confidentiality.
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• We propose three secure document similarity search schemes. The first
one is based on secure sketches. The second one is based on locality
sensitive hashing (LSH)(i.e MinHash). The last one uses the Z-order
prefix encrypted using HMAC algorithm. The security properties of
the proposed algorithms are different while some of them provide ac-
cess and search pattern privacy in addition to document and query
confidentiality, the others provide basic security for data and query
privacy.
• For all the above algorithms, we use the MapReduce parallel processing
framework which is a popular computing model for big data applica-
tions in recent times.
1.3 Outline
The thesis is organized as follows: the next chapter (Chapter 2), presents
a literature review on prior work related to document similarity over plain
and encrypted data and indexes. In Chapter 3, we provide the preliminaries
that will be used throughout the thesis. In Chapter 4, we introduce a novel
document similarity search algorithm that is based on Z-order prefix filter-
ing. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 give the details of three different secure document
similarity search algorithms, respectively. In Chapter 5, we explain Secure
Sketch algorithm. In Chapter 6, a secure search algorithm based on a lo-
cality sensitive hash function known as MinHash is explained. And finally,
in Chapter 7 we explain the secure ZOLIP algorithm, which is the secure
version of the algorithm given in Chapter 4. Finally, chapter 8 concludes the
thesis.
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Chapter 2
RELATED WORKS
This chapter presents a short survey on previous works in the literature re-
lated to document similarity over plaintext and encrypted documents. Effi-
ciency and accuracy of different algorithms are discussed and their advantages
and disadvantages are pointed out.
2.1 Related Work on Similarity Search
In the literature, the problem of set-similarity on a single machine is con-
sidered in several works [5–8]. These works are mainly focused on reducing
the complexity of vector similarity join. Angiulli et al. [9] used the Z-order
space filling curve in order to find the similarity between two high dimen-
sional spatial data sets using Minkowski metrics. This method performs well
for finding close pairs in high dimensional data, but it is not suitable for
text based similarity detection. For text based similarity, as in the case of
document similarity problem, the cosine similarity metric is more suitable
than the Minkowski metric.
Connor and Kumar [10] suggested another technique for the similar doc-
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ument detection problem. They used a binary search technique to find k-
nearest neighbors (k-NN) within a selected Z hypercube. A popular approach
in other works is adapting filtering techniques that filter out pairs that can-
not surpass a given similarity threshold. Filtering decreases the number of
candidates for the computation of similarity metric and, therefore, the num-
ber of similarity join operations by eliminating the documents that do not
share a common important term with the query.
There are various filtering techniques used in the literature. A prefix
filtering method is suggested by Chaudhuri et al. [7]. The length filtering
method is utilized in the works [5] and [8]. Positional and suffix filters are
proposed by Xiao et al. [11]. Sarawagi and Kirpal [6] proposed a method
called PPJoin+ that utilizes inverted index and uses a Pair-Count algo-
rithm which generates pairs that share certain number of tokens. Arasu
et al. [5] proposed a signature based method, in which the features of docu-
ments are represented by signatures and the similarity among the documents
is calculated using the similarity of the underlying signatures. Zhu et al. [12]
suggested a searching technique based on cosine similarity. They proposed
an algorithm that utilizes a diagonal traversal strategy to filter out unrelated
documents. In this algorithm, the elements in the data set are represented
by binary vectors, meaning that only the existence of terms is considered,
ignoring their frequencies or importance in the data set.
The MapReduce computing model is also considered for the similarity
search problem and this leads to parallel join algorithms for large data sets
that are stored on cloud servers. Elsayed et al. [13] suggested a MapReduce
Model with a Full-Filtering technique. They used a simple filter that finds
only the pairs that share common tokens. The proposed method is composed
of two phases. While the first phase parses and creates the indexes for the
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terms in each document, the second phase finds the similar pairs that share
these terms. Vernica et al. [1] used the PPJoin+ method [6] in order to
perform the self-join operation. Yang et al. [14] proposed a method that uses
prefix and suffix filters with two phases of MapReduce. Inverted index is used
in [15] combined with prefix filtering. A modified double pass MapReduce
prefix filtering method was proposed by Baraglia et al. [16]. Phan et al. [17]
used Bloom filtering for building similarity pairs, in which each pair should
intersect at least in one position with the arrays generated by the Bloom
filters.
The previous works in the literature of similarity search do not take the
importance of the terms in documents into consideration to the best of our
knowledge (at least to the extent in this work). This affects the seman-
tic similarity between documents (i.e., some documents may have the same
terms but in different contexts). In our algorithm, in order to address this
issue, we utilize a cosine similarity based filtering technique using the relative
importance of terms in documents for finding similar documents.
Over the years, several secure similar document detection methods have
been proposed in the literature. There are two main assumptions on this
topic: similar document detection among two parties and similar document
detection over encrypted cloud data. The core of search over cloud data de-
pends on searchable encryption methods, therefore several different search-
able encryption methods are proposed over the recent years [18,19]
The majority of the works aim similar document detection among two
parties. The parties A and B want to compute the similarity between their
documents a and b respectively, without disclosing a or b. In this approach,
the parties know the data of their own in plaintext form, but do not know
the documents in the other party [20–22]. Jiang et al. [20] proposed a cosine
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similarity based similar document detection method between two parties.
They propose two approaches one with random matrix multiplication and one
with component-wise homomorphic encryption. An efficient similarity search
method among two parties is proposed by Murugesan et al. [21]. They explore
clustering based solutions that are significantly efficient while providing high
accuracy. Buyukbilen and Bakiras [22] proposed another similar document
detection method between two parties. They generate document fingerprints
using simhash and reduce the problem to a secure XOR operation between
two bit vectors. The secure XOR operation is formulated as a secure two
party computation protocol.
The other important line of research is similar document detection over
encrypted cloud data. This approach is more challenging than the former
one since the cloud cannot access the plaintext version of the data it stores.
Wong et al. [23] propose a SCONEDB (Secure Computation ON Encrypted
DataBase) model, which captures execution and security requirements. They
developed an asymmetric scalar product preserving encryption (ASPE). In
this method the query points and database points are encrypted differently,
which avoids distance recoverability using only the encrypted values. Yao
et al. [24] investigate the secure nearest neighbor problem and rephrased its
definition. Instead of finding the encrypted exact nearest neighbor, server
finds a relevant encrypted partition such that the exact nearest neighbor
is guaranteed to be in that partition. Elmehdwi et al. [25] also consider
the k-NN problem over encrypted data base outsourced to a cloud. This
method can protect the confidentiality of users’ search patterns and access
patterns. The method uses the euclidean distance for finding the similarity
and utilize several subroutines such as secure minimum, secure multiplication
and secure OR operations. Overall, the method provides the same security
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guarantees with the method proposed in Chapter 5 but considers Euclidean
distance, where cosine similarity is considered in our work. Cosine similarity
is especially useful for high-dimensional spaces. In document similarity, each
term is assigned to a dimension and the documents is characterized by a
vector where the value of each dimension is the corresponding tf-idf score.
Therefore, cosine similarity captures the similarity among two documents
better than the Euclidean similarity.
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Chapter 3
PRELIMINARIES
To understand the proposed schemes and follow the pertinent discussions
in this thesis, this chapter provides explanations for the following prelimi-
naries: “Term Relevancy Scoring”, “Z -Order Mapping”, “Locality Sensitive
Hashing” and “Hadoop and MapReduce Framework”.
3.1 Term Relevancy Score
We can represent a data object (e.g., a document, an image, a video file, etc.)
as a vector of features, which identifies that data object. In this thesis, we
use documents that are represented by a set of terms (i.e., keywords, words
from human language). More formally, each document di in the data set D
contains a certain number of terms from a global dictionary T , where |T | = δ
is the total number of terms in the dictionary. Each document in the data
set is represented as a vector of term weights derived from the dictionary T .
In our scheme, a component of the term vector for the document di is in fact
the relevance score of the corresponding term tj, which simply indicates the
importance of the term tj in distinguishing di from all the other documents
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in D.
One of the most commonly used weighting factor in information retrieval
is the tf-idf value of a term in a document [26]. This factor quantifies the
importance of a term in a document and combines two metrics: i) the term
frequency (tf) which is the number of occurrences of the term in a document
(i.e., tfj,i is the number of occurrence of the term tj in the document di)
and ii) the inverse document frequency (idf) which, represents the number
of documents that contain the term tj among the whole document set. In
other words idf is a measure of the rarity of the term tj in document set D.
The tf-idf of a term tj in the document di is calculated as
tf-idfj,i = tfj,i × idfj.
In practice, since a given term usually occurs only in a limited number of
documents, the tf-idf vectors contain many zero elements and thus, tf-idf
values are stored in a sparse vector to optimize the memory usage.
Let S(di, dj) be the similarity function that quantifies the similarity be-
tween two documents, di and dj. Let σ be the threshold of minimum required
similarity for the pair di and dj. The similarity join problem is to find the
candidate dj for the document di such that S(di, dj) ≥ σ. There are different
choices for suitable similarity functions depending on the application domain.
The most commonly used similarity metrics in the literature for the objects
di and dj are described as follows
• Jaccard similarity Sj(di, dj) =
|di ∩ dj|
|di ∪ dj|
,
• Cosine similarity Sc(di, dj) =
di · dj
||di|| · ||dj||
,
• Hamming distance Sh(di, dj) = |(di − dj) ∪ (dj − di)|,
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which is defined as the size of their symmetric differences.
In the subsequent chapters, we use both cosine similarity and Jaccard simi-
larity (or an approximation of the latter).
3.2 Cosine Similarity
The idea behind using cosine similarity is to take into account tf-idf values
of terms in document comparison operations as the set of words with high
tf-idf values are a determining factor for similarity between two documents.
The cosine similarity can be calculated as
Sc(di, dj) =
di · dj
||di|| · ||dj||
=
δ∑
t=1
dit × djt√
δ∑
t=1
d2it ×
√
δ∑
t=1
d2jt
,
where dit and djt are the weights of the corresponding terms in the documents
di and dj. Without loss of generality, we can assume that di and dj contain
the same number of terms. In case there are different number of terms, we
can always pad the term vector with terms whose tf-idf values are 0. From
the above formula, one can understand that the terms with higher tf-idf
values contribute to the cosine similarity metric significantly more than the
terms with relatively smaller tf-idf values. This observation is the core of our
filtering technique. Example 1 demonstrates the calculation of the similarity
of documents using only the important terms.
Example 1 Let a,b and c be documents represented with tf-idf vectors as
follows abusing the notation,
a = (0, 8, 5, 0.25, 0.125, 0, 0.02, 0, 0, 0.1)
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b = (0.5, 9, 4, 0, 0, 0.125, 0, 0, 0, 0)
c = (9, 0.2, 7, 0, 0.04, 1, 0.5, 1, 0, 7).
Here, let a¯, b¯, c¯ be the projected vectors using only the terms with high tf-idf
values, ignoring the values less than 1. Then we obtain the following term
vectors for the objects a, b, and c, respectively
a¯ = (0, 8, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
b¯ = (0, 9, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
c¯ = (9, 0, 7, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 7).
Notice that, if we calculate the cosine similarity between each pair of the tf-
idf vectors we see that Sc(a¯, b¯) = 0.9888 ≈ Sc(a, b) = 0.9883 and Sc(a¯, c¯) =
0.2757 ≈ Sc(a, c) = 0.2936. Therefore, even though the pair (a, c) has more
common terms, we can conclude that the closest pair is (a, b), small the terms
with small tf-idf values have a very low effect on the cosine similarity.
3.3 Z-Order Mapping
Z-order or Morton order is a space filling curve, whose different iterations
can be computed as shown in Figure 3.1. As the number of iterations in-
creases, the space can be filled with higher accuracy. One important property
of Z-order curve is that, it preserves the locality of data points in the space.
Therefore, Z-order is a frequently used approach for mapping multidimen-
sional data into one dimensional space and still supports operations such as
comparison and similarity check after the mapping. Here, we formalize our
terminology for the Z-order curves.
Definition 1 (Iteration on Z-Order Curve) The lth iteration of the Z-
order curve in δ-dimensional space is a set of 2δ
l
sub-curves, where each sub-
14
(a) Zeroth Iteration
on Z-Order
(b) First Iteration
on Z-Order
(c) Second Iteration
on Z-Order
Figure 3.1: Z-Order Space Filling
curve is composed of points whose coordinates have the same l most significant
bits.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the Z-order sub-curves for different iterations on the
original curve.
Definition 2 (Z-Shape of Order l) A Z-shape of order l in δ-dimensional
space is any of the Z-order sub-curves in an lth iteration of the Z-order curve.
Intuitively, each sub-curve in an iteration on a Z-order curve is a Z-shape.
For instance, the circles labeled as A and B in Figure 3.2 enclose the second
and first order Z-shapes, respectively.
Definition 3 (Z-Value) The Z-value of a data point in the multidimen-
sional space is obtained by interleaving the bits of binary representation of
the data point coordinate values.
Points in the δ-dimensional space are represented with scalars (i.e., Z-value),
which preserve their locality in such a way that similarity and comparison
between points can be calculated. For instance, the point (110, 001) in the Z-
shape of order 2 in Figure 3.2 is mapped to Z-value of 101001. In summary,
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Figure 3.2: Data Points on Z-Order Curve
the Z-value of a point in multidimensional space is simply a scalar that can
be used in various applications. In the literature [10, 27, 28], the Z-value is
used to find the k-nearest neighbors in spatial data sets.
A document represented by a vector of tf-idf values can be viewed as a
point in the multidimensional space of terms. Then, the Z-order mapping
can be used to map a document into one dimensional space by preserving
the locality of the document in the multidimensional space. Consequently, it
will be possible to compute the similarity of documents using their Z-values.
For instance, in the two-dimensional space in Figure 3.2 (i.e., δ = 2), the
circle A denotes a Z-shape of the second order while the one denoted by B
is a Z-shape of the first order. The points in the Z-shape A are (000, 110),
(000, 111), (001, 110), and (001, 111). Their corresponding Z-values, namely
(010100), (010101), (010110), and (010111), have the same prefix of (0101).
Similarly, the Z-values of the points in B share the prefix (01). From this, we
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can conclude that the points on a Z-shape of larger order (i.e., which share
a longer prefix) are closer. The common prefix in Z-values of the points
can be used to calculate the similarity of documents (i.e., closeness in the
multidimensional space), where the coordinates of the points are the tf-idf
values of the corresponding terms in the documents.
The next example demonstrates a technique that uses the Z-order map-
ping to obtain the most important terms in a document. Let λ · δ be the
number of prefix bits shared in the same Z-shape, where δ is the number of
terms in the dictionary T (i.e., the dimension of the document space) and λ
is an accuracy parameter chosen appropriately.
Example 2 Recall that in Example 1, we have the following term vectors
for three documents, where δ = 10
a = (0, 8, 5, 0.25, 0.125, 0, 0.02, 0, 0, 0.1)
b = (0.5, 9, 4, 0, 0, 0.125, 0, 0, 0, 0)
c = (9, 0.2, 7, 0, 0.04, 1, 0.5, 1, 0, 7).
In order to represent all the tf-idf values, we need four and three bits to
represent their integer and fractional parts, respectively. Thus, we need 7
bits in total for the tf-idf values. However, by setting λ = 3 at the expense
of losing precision, we get the prefix values of the term vectors shown in the
following table.
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Doc a
Z-Order itera-
tion
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10
1st iteration pre-
fix
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2nd iteration
prefix
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3rd iteration pre-
fix
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Doc b
Z-Order itera-
tion
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10
1st iteration pre-
fix
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2nd iteration
prefix
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3rd iteration pre-
fix
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Doc c
Z-Order itera-
tion
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10
1st iteration pre-
fix
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2nd iteration
prefix
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3rd iteration pre-
fix
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Notice that documents a and b have the same prefix for all three iterations.
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This is natural since a and b are very similar as shown in Example 1.
In Chapter 4, we first develop an efficient method to find similar docu-
ments such that, cosine similarity between two documents is computed only
if they are in the same Z-shape of the λ-th order; i.e., having the same λδ bits
as prefix in their Z values. On the other hand, this method, which eliminates
the need of calculating the cosine similarity between many dissimilar docu-
ment pairs and therefore yields a very efficient implementation, can only be
applicable in cases where highly similar documents exist. If the data set does
not contain sufficiently many (i.e., k) highly similar documents, it is required
to also consider the documents that do not reside in the same Z-shape of λ
order.
For similar documents that do not reside in the same Z-shape of the de-
sired order, we propose a slightly different method, in which only documents
that contain common important terms (i.e., that have high tf-idf values) will
be compared. In other words, if two documents contain at least one im-
portant term in common, their cosine similarity is calculated, otherwise the
computation is skipped.
Definition 4 (l-th Iteration Projection) Let di = (di1 , . . . , diδ) be a doc-
ument represented in δ-dimensional space of term tf-idf values. Let also dlij
denote the most significant l-bits of the values dij for j = 1, . . . , δ. Then
we can define the projection of the vector di to l-th iteration on the Z-order
curve as
d¯lij =


dij , if d
l
ij
> 0
0, otherwise,
for j ∈ {1, . . . , δ}.
19
The projection takes already a sparse vector di and generates an expectedly
much sparser vector of term tf-idf values, d¯i. We check the new vector, having
only the important terms as non-zero elements, to see whether it represents
the document with a sufficiently high accuracy.
In the proposed method, we start with 1-st iteration projection d¯i
1
of
document, for which we try to find similar documents, and compute the
similarity, Sc(di, d¯
1
i ). If the similarity is larger than a predefined similarity
threshold σ, namely Sc(di, d¯
1
i ) > σ, then we use 1-st iteration projections of
the two documents to decide to compute their cosine similarities.
If Sc(di, d¯
1
i ) < σ, then we use a higher level projection d¯i
l
with l > 1,
where l is the minimum value that satisfies the threshold σ. Then, we com-
pute Sc(di, dj) of two documents di and dj only if d¯
l
i and d¯
l
j have at least
one common non-zero term. The following example illustrates the proposed
technique.
Example 3 Let the threshold and the precision parameters be set as, σ =
0.8 and λ = 3, respectively. Also let the data set has the following three
documents with δ = 13,
a = (0, 27, 17, 0, 5, 9, 0, 11, 6, 11, 0, 13, 14)
b = (0, 27, 21, 0, 0, 0, 15, 0, 5, 0, 0, 6, 10)
c = (0, 0, 0, 29, 0, 0, 16, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 5).
Using the first and second iteration projections, we can obtain the following
vectors for the document a,
a¯1 = (0, 27, 17, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
a¯2 = (0, 27, 17, 0, 0, 9, 0, 11, 0, 11, 0, 13, 14)
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The corresponding cosine similarities are computed as
Sc(a, a¯
1) = 0.7590,
Sc(a, a¯
2) = 0.8955.
As can be observed, the second iteration projection a¯2 satisfies the given
threshold. Therefore, documents whose 2nd iteration projections do not share
any term with a¯2 (i.e., that have a zero tf-idf score for the corresponding terms
that appear in a¯2), will be filtered out and their cosine similarities will not be
computed. Note that, a¯2 has seven nonzero terms as opposed to nine nonzero
terms in the original vector a, which potentially eliminates unnecessary sim-
ilarity comparisons.
Here, Sc(b, a) is computed since b¯2 and a¯2 have common terms. However,
Sc(c, a) is not computed since a¯2 and c¯2 do not share any common term.
Although a and c have a common term (i.e., the last term), it is omitted due
to its low tf-idf value in c. Indeed, the document b is much closer to a as the
following cosine similarities of the original documents indicate
Sc(a, b) = 0.8045,
Sc(a, c) = 0.0493.
The selected λ value which is used to improve the accuracy is a data set
dependent, and should be determined experimentally. The methods that are
briefly introduced in this section, will be formalized in Chapter 4.
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3.4 Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH)
The main principle of locality sensitive hashing is to represent arbitrary
length features of data items in constant sized sets that are called signatures.
The idea is to hash each feature set Fi into a constant size (and preferably
small) signature that can represent the similarity accurately. Signatures pro-
vide an approximation for measuring the similarity between two data items
and the accuracy of the approximation is directly related with the length
of the signatures such that, the longer the signature the more accurate the
result. However, while very small signatures are sufficient for detection of
either almost identical or totally unrelated stuff, relatively longer signatures
are required for similarities in between.
The goal of LSH functions is that, for inputs with high similarity, the hash
functions should provide the same output with high probability and provide
different output with high probability otherwise. Note that, this principle is
completely different from the principle of cryptographic hash functions, where
finding two different inputs that provide the same output is very difficult.
The signatures are represented as sets. A well known metric for repre-
senting the similarity between two sets is the Jaccard similarity.
Definition 5 (Jaccard Similarity) Let A and B be two sets, the Jaccard
similarity of A and B is defined as in Equation (3.1).
Js(A,B) =
|A ∩B|
|A ∪B|
. (3.1)
The elements of signatures are constructed using MinHash functions [29]
which is defined as follows.
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Definition 6 (MinHash) : Let ∆ be a set of elements, P be a permutation
on ∆ and P [i] be the ith element in the permutation P . MinHash of a set
D ⊆ ∆ under permutation P is defined as:
hP (D) = min({i|1 ≤ i ≤ |∆| ∧ P [i] ∈ D})
Each data element signature is generated by λ MinHash functions each
applied with a different randomly chosen permutation. The resulting signa-
ture for a data set element D is:
Sig(D) = {hP1(D), . . . , hPλ(D)}, (3.2)
where hPj is the MinHash Function under permutation Pj.
The MinHash functions are used while generating the signatures since
there is a perfect correlation between the Jaccard similarity and MinHash
functions. The probability that MinHash functions provide the same output
for two inputs A and B is equal to the Jaccard similarity between A and B
as shown in the Equation (3.3).
Pr[h(A) = h(B)] = Js(A,B) =
|A ∩B|
|A ∪B|
. (3.3)
As MinHash functions with different permutations provide independent ex-
periments, using longer signatures (i.e., larger λ) provides more accurate
results.
3.5 Hadoop and MapReduce Framework
Currently, the MapReduce programming model became a common model
for parallel processing. MapReduce employs a parallel execution and coor-
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dination model that can be used to manage large-scale computations over
massive data sets [29, 30]. The Hadoop framework [31] is a well known and
widely used MapReduce parallel processing framework. It works on a clus-
ter of computers called cloud. The Hadoop framework works utilizing the
MapReduce programing modeling.
The Hadoop framework contains two main parts, namely Hadoop Dis-
tributed File System (HDFS) and NextGen MapReduce (YARN). The files
are stored in the HDFS, which is a special distributed file system. YARN
or MapReduce 2.0 is a system that facilitates writing arbitrary distributed
processing frameworks and applications of large data sets.
Data replication is one of the key factors that improves the effectiveness of
the Hadoop framework, that survives node failures while utilizing huge num-
ber of cluster nodes for data intensive computations. The MapReduce model
is successfully implemented in the Hadoop framework as the details of the
network communication, process management, interprocess communication,
efficient massive data movement and fault tolerance are transparent to the
user. Typically, a developer needs to provide only configuration parameters
and several high-level routines.
The Hadoop framework is used by most of the major actors including
Google, Yahoo and IBM, largely for applications involving search engines
and large-scale data processing (e.g., big data applications).
The MapReduce model is based on two functions, Map and Reduce. The
Map function is responsible for assigning a list of data items, represented
as key-value pairs to cluster nodes. The Map function receives key-value
pairs, and sends the result as intermediate data to the reducer. The Reducer
function gets the mapped data and applies the processing operation. It
receives the intermediate data as a key and a list of values as (key,[values]).
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Reducer Reducer Reducer
DFS
Shuﬄe
Mapper Mapper Mapper
DFS
Figure 3.3: MapReduce Job Execution
The signature of these two functions are
map:(k1,v1)→ [(k2,v2)]
reduce:(k2,[v2])→[(k3,v3)].
The shuﬄing process, between the Map and Reduce functions as illustrated
in Figure 3.3, is responsible for designating all keys with the same value to the
same computation node. The reducer do the desired operations for records
sharing a common property and send the final result to user. Figure 3.3
shows the working principle of MapReduce.
3.6 Hash-based Message Authentication Code
(HMAC)
Hash-based message authentication code known as HMAC is one of the pop-
ular deterministic hashing functions used in cryptography [32]. It is used for
constructing a fixed size message authentication code using a secret cryp-
tographic key. The cryptographic strength of the HMAC depends upon
the cryptographic strength of the underlying construction (e.g. a crypto-
graphic hash function), the lengths of its output, and the secret key. In
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Chapters 6 and 7, we use SHA-based HMAC functions for the document
signatures. HMAC function can be calculated using the following formula
HMAK(K,m) = H((K ⊕ opad)||H((K ⊕ ipad||m)),
where H can be a cryptographic hash function, opad is the outer padding,
ipad is the inner padding, K is a secret key appropriately padded, and m is
the message, data or document.
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Chapter 4
EFFICIENT DOCUMENT
SIMILARITY SEARCH
UTILIZING Z-ORDER
PREFIX FILTERING
This chapter proposes a new, efficient document similarity search algorithm [33].
The algorithm uses a new document filtering technique utilizing the prefixes
obtained via Z-order space-filling curves as explained previously. The pre-
fix in this algorithm filters the documents that do not share only important
terms. The subsequent sections in this chapter describe the algorithm and
present comparison with another technique in the literature. The proposed
algorithm shows a desired improvement in the time performance. Last sec-
tion contains accuracy evaluation for the new algorithm.
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4.1 Introduction
There is an ever-increasing demand for efficient and scalable tools that can
analyze and process immense amount of, possibly unstructured, data, which
keeps increasing in size and complexity. Finding similarities (or duplicates)
among multiple data items, or documents, is one of the fundamental oper-
ations, which can be extremely challenging due to the nature of big data.
In particular, similarity search on a huge data set, where the documents are
represented as multi-dimensional feature vectors, necessitates pair-wise com-
parisons, which requires the computation of a distance metric, and therefore
can be very time and resource consuming, if not infeasible.
A commonly used technique, known as filtering, decreases the number
of pairwise comparisons by skipping the comparison of two documents if
they are not potentially similar; e.g., they do not share any common feature.
Also, representation, storage, management and processing of documents play
an important role in the performance of a similarity search method. A dis-
tributed file system and a parallel programming model such as MapReduce [4]
are necessary components of a scalable and efficient solution in big data ap-
plications.
This work focuses on the general problem of detecting the k-most similar
documents for each document within a given data set (henceforth self join),
and between two arbitrary sets of documents (R-S join), namely query set
and data set. The problem is formalized as follows.
Definition 7 (R-S Join Top-k Set Similarity) Let D be a set of docu-
ments {d1, . . . , dn}, di ∈ D. Let Q be a set of query documents {q1, . . . , qm},
qj ∈ Q. Then R-S top-k set similarity is defined as:
∀qj ∈ Q, top-k(qj,D) = {dj1, . . . , djk},
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where dji is the ith nearest record to qj in D.
Definition 8 (Self Join Top-k Set Similarity) Let D be a set of docu-
ments {d1, . . . , dn}, di ∈ D. Then self join top-k set similarity is defined
as:
∀dj ∈ D, top-k(dj,D) = {dj1, . . . , djk},
where dji 6= dj is the ith nearest record to dj in D.
Intuitively, the self join case is the generalization of the R-S join case such
that Q = D.
The trivial solution for the set similarity problem, for two sets of items
Q and D, is to compare each element in Q with each element in D. This
solution has O(δmn) complexity, where m and n are the number of elements
in Q and D respectively, and δ is the number of dimensions (i.e., features)
in Q and D. Recent trends and research are concerned about computing set
similarity-join algorithms in an efficient and high performance manner, hence
new set similarity-join algorithms that reduce the number of comparisons are
proposed.
Current research mainly adapts filtering techniques that filter out pairs
that have similarity below a given threshold. Clearly, the adopted filtering
technique plays the utmost role in the efficiency as well as the effectiveness
of a similarity search algorithm. In this work, we propose a new cosine simi-
larity based filtering technique to improve the performance of the similarity
calculation.
In our solution, we suggest a new Z-order based filtering technique in
order to eliminate dissimilar documents before performing the costly op-
eration of calculating the cosine similarity. Documents in a data set are
represented as points on Z-order space filling curves on multidimensional
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space of documents’ features. A projection based on the most important
features of documents is utilized to filter out dissimilar documents that do
not share common important features. The proposed method also filters out
documents that only share features of low importance, which have very little
effect on the similarity between the data objects. The technique provides a
remarkable improvement, especially on finding highly similar documents very
quickly. And finally, we describe the algorithms to implement the proposed
technique as parallel programs that can take advantage of the Hadoop [31]
MapReduce parallel programming framework.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The details of the pro-
posed Z-order with Lambda Iteration Prefix (ZOLIP) filtering algorithm are
explained in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 presents the experimental results that
show the accuracy and the efficiency of the proposed method. Finally, the
conclusions are provided in Section 4.4.
4.2 The Proposed Filtering Method
In this section we explain the proposed techniques of the Z-order with Lambda
Iteration Prefix (ZOLIP) filtering algorithm. The algorithm has three phases.
In the first phase, the ZOLIP algorithm considers the document vectors that
lie on the same Z-shape of λ order in the Z-order curve. In other words, this
phase is designed to find highly similar (i.e., near duplicate) documents in
the data set. If this phase cannot find k documents, the second phase consid-
ers the documents that are on different Z-shapes. In the second phase, the
algorithm finds the most important terms in the queried document such that
any document that does not contain any of those important terms, cannot
be in the top k similar list of the queried document. Then the similarities
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with the documents sharing important terms are calculated. Finally, the last
phase performs the actual join operations such that the outputs of the first
and the second phases are combined and sorted to find the top k similar list
of the queried document.
4.2.1 Phase 1: Near-Duplicate Detection (NDD)
Initially, the first phase reads each document record that is composed of a
key/value pair. While the key represents a unique document id, the value
holds a vector which contains the tf-idf values of the terms of the correspond-
ing document. Instead of the classical vectors, sparse vector representation
is used for improving the performance and easing memory requirements as
most of the vector elements are zero.
Sparse vector is a data structure that stores only the none-zero entries
together with corresponding index values. We assume that the number of
dimensions (δ), the number of iterations on the curve (λ) and the maximum
tf-idf value (µ) in the whole data set are publicly known and passed as a
configuration parameter to the map function in the proposed method, which
is described in Algorithm 1. Note that, the operations over sparse vectors
are optimized even though the algorithm descriptions are given in classical
forms. For instance, the for loop in Steps 4-6 in Algorithm 1 is only executed
for non-zero tf-idf values.
The map function in Algorithm 1 receives the tf-idf scores of each doc-
ument in the data set D, its id, docId, the maximum tf-idf value µ, the
dimension δ, and the precision λ for tf-idf values.
The “bitLength” function (Step 2) returns the bit length of the binary
representation for the maximum tf-idf value (µ). Then, the method goes
over the coordinate values and normalizes them so that they are represented
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Algorithm 1 Near-Dupplicate Detection(NDD)
1: procedure Map(docId, d, µ, δ, λ)
2: γ ← bitLength(µ)
3: ZOLIP ← null
4: for j = 1 to δ do
5: d[j]← Normalize(d[j], γ)
6: end for
7: for l = 1 to λ do
8: for j = 1 to δ do
9: bit← getBit(d[j], l)
10: ZOLIP ← ZOLIP ||bit
11: end for
12: end for
13: sendToReducer(ZOLIP, 〈docId : d〉)
14: end procedure
. listDOC contains the documents with the same ZOLIP key
15: procedure Reduce(ZOLIP , {〈docId : d〉} )
16: for all di ∈ listDOC do . for each document in listDOC
17: ksimi ← null
18: for all docj ∈ listDOC and i 6= j do
19: ksimi ← findTKSD() . compute similarity and sort
20: end for
21: end for
22: return ∀i (〈docIdi : d〉 , 〈{〈ksimi,Sc〉}, (yes/no)〉)
23: end procedure
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with the number of bits used for the maximum tf-idf value (Step 5). The
“Normalize” function gets the bit length of each coordinate tf-idf value and
finds the difference (dif) between the number of bits of the maximum tf-idf
and the tf-idf of the current coordinate, and pads (dif)-many zero bits to the
left of the actual coordinate value to make all the tf-idf values represented
with the same number of bits.
Then, the map function extracts the bits of the normalized tf-idf value of
each term starting from the most significant bit using the function “getBit”
(Step 9), which returns the l-th most significant bit. This operation will be
repeated for each of the λ bits of the tf-idf scores. At each iteration, the
mapper interleaves the extracted bit and concatenates it to a ZOLIP key
(Step 10), which is a sparse vector that represents the none-zero bits in the
Z-value.
The key/value pair sent to the reducer is composed of the ZOLIP key
and the list of document identifiers and their tf-idf scores as in
(ZOLIPkey, 〈docId : d〉).
All the documents that have the same ZOLIP key are grouped by the shuﬄe
process and sent to the reducer instances.
The reducers receive the list of documents that have the same ZOLIP key
and calculates the cosine similarity between these records to find the top-k
similar documents for each document. The function “findTKSD” (which
stands for “find top-k similar documents”) calculates the similarity between
documents and sorts the documents depending on their similarity. Then, it
selects the top-k similar documents and saves them in a sorted list “ksimi”.
Figure 4.1 illustrates an example, in which the mapper creates the ZOLIP
keys Z1, for documents “a” and “b” and Z2 for document “c”. Then, it passes
the key value pairs to the reducer. The reducer receives the documents with
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Figure 4.1: An Example Execution of ZOLIP Phase 1
the same ZOLIP key, and compares these documents to find the top-k similar
documents.
The reduce function returns the records in the format
(〈docIdi : d〉 , 〈{〈ksimi,Sc〉}, (yes/no)〉).
Here, the first element is the key of the record (i.e., the identifier of the doc-
ument that we intent to find its k-similar documents). The second element,
which is the value of the record, contains two parts. The first part is a list
that contains the top k-similar document identifiers with their correspond-
ing similarity values as (Sc). The second part (i.e., (yes/no)) is an indicator
that shows whether the top-k similar documents are found or not. If k sim-
ilar documents are found in this step, no further search is applied for this
document. Otherwise, further search in a different Z-shape is required.
Algorithm 1 represents the pseudo code based on the MapReduce pro-
gramming model. The algorithm can be used both for self-join and R-S join
operations. Algorithm 1 is described for self-join operation, in which we
find k similar documents for every document in the data set. In R-S join
operation, documents should be labeled as query documents and data set
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documents. Consequently, in Step 16 of Algorithm 1 only documents in the
query set should be considered while Step 18 should use the documents in
the data set.
The NDD phase is expected to find k similar documents for a relatively
large number of documents without further computations needed for them.
While this reduces the overall complexity of the top-k similarity search, fur-
ther computation is needed for the documents, for which k similar documents
are not found. To this end, we propose a method based on common important
terms to complete the computation for the remaining part of the database.
4.2.2 Phase 2: Common Important Terms (CIT)
Some documents, although similar, may reside in different Z-shapes. In or-
der to calculate the similarity between two such documents, we stipulate that
they share at least one important (i.e., high tf-idf valued) term. We, there-
fore, propose utilizing only the most important terms to eliminate similarity
computation for the distant documents. Note that the probability of two
documents, that do not share any important term, being in the top-k similar
documents of each other is very low.
The common important terms (CIT) phase contains two mapper and one
reducer functions. The first mapper function reads the output of the NDD
phase to check the (yes/no) value for a document. If k similar documents
are not found for the document, the second phase, common important terms
(CIT), utilizes the l-th iteration projection in Z order curves to determine
the important terms in the document that will be used to filter out dissimilar
documents.
The first mapper (the procedure MAP1() in Algorithm 2) computes the
projection d¯1i of document di, which contains tf-idf values of the most impor-
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Algorithm 2 Common Important Terms(CIT)
1: procedure Map1(docId, 〈{〈ksimilar,Sc〉}, (yes/no)〉 , λ, µ)
2: . this mapper reads the output of phase 1
3: if (yes/no) = no then
4: d¯0i ← createEmptyV ec()
5: sim← 0
6: for l = 1 to λ AND sim < σ do
7: . λ is the number of bits in tf-idf scores
8: d¯li ← Project(di, l)
9: sim← Sc(di, d¯
l
i)
10: end for
11: for j = 1 to δ do
12: if d¯lij 6= 0 then
13: term← d¯lij
14: sendToReducer(term, 〈Q : docId, di〉)
15: end if
16: end for
17: end if
18: end procedure
19: procedure Map2(docId, di)) . It reads the data set documents and
functions exactly as the first mapper.
20: sendToReducer(term, 〈D : docId, di〉)
21: end procedure
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22: procedure Reduce(term,{〈(Q/D) : docId, di〉})
. Documents will be partitioned into query and data sets
23: QList← null
24: DList← null
25: for all di do
26: if di is a query document then
27: addQList(di)
28: else
29: addDList(di)
30: end if
31: end for
32: for all di ∈ Qlist do
33: candidatesi ← null
34: for all dj ∈ Dlist do
35: candidatesi ← docIdDj
36: end for
37: for dj ∈ candidatesi do
38: return (〈docIdi : docIdj〉 ,Sc(di, dj))
39: end for
40: end for
41: end procedure
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tant terms in the document. Then, the similarity between d¯1i and the original
vector di will be calculated. If the similarity threshold is satisfied, namely
Sc(di, d¯
1
i ) ≥ σ, the terms in d¯
1
i are sent to the reducer. Otherwise, a higher
degree projection d¯li is calculated to satisfy the threshold.
Here, MAP1() creates a key-value pair for each important term, in which
the term is used as a key, and the vector di and the document id are con-
sidered as the value of the pair. In other words, the original record for the
document is replicated as many times as the number of important terms in
the projection d¯li. In order to distinguish the documents in the query set
from the documents in the data set (the latter will be processed by the sec-
ond mapper MAP2() function), a prefix “Q:” is added in the value part of
the pair. The resulting record is of the format, (term, 〈Q : docId : di〉).
Using the setting given in Example 3, Figure 4.2 illustrates an example
execution of the CIT algorithm steps for finding similar documents that have
common important terms. Note that, in the mapper stage, the term indices
that are exposed to the reducer correspond only to the terms with high
importance (i.e., the terms that appear in a¯2).
The second mapper, (the procedure MAP2() in Algorithm 2), performs
the same operations as the first mapper, but this time on the data set docu-
ments, with the only difference that, the prefix “D:” is added instead of “Q:”.
The resulting record format is of the form (term,〈D : docID : di〉). As in the
case of the document in the query set, MAP2() creates as many new records
as the number of important terms for the corresponding document.
The reducer in this phase receives the key value pairs from the first and
the second mappers. Then, it partitions the records into two sets, Qlist and
Dlist, depending on whether the document is in the query or in the data set.
The first mapper returns the important terms in the query documents com-
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Figure 4.2: An Example Execution of ZOLIP Phase 2
bined with their coordinates, while the second mapper returns the important
terms in data set documents combined with their coordinates. The reducer
creates two partitions. The partition can easily be done by checking the pre-
fixes in the value part, Q and D. Consequently, for every document in the
query and data set, the reducer stores them in Qlist and Dlist, respectively.
The last stage of the reducer calculates the similarity between di ∈ Qlist
and dj ∈ Dlist. Then, the identifiers of di and dj are combined to form a key
for the pair in which the value is Sc(di,dj). Consequently, the final output
of this phase is of the form, (〈docIdi : docIdj〉, Sc(di,dj)), where di and dj
represent the documents in the query set and the data set, respectively.
Figure 4.2 visualizes all the steps on the setting from Example 3.
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4.2.3 Phase 3: Join Phase(JP)
In the join phase (steps are described in Algorithm 3), in order to find the
actual top-k similar documents, the join operation is applied on the results
from the first and the second phases. This phase contains two mappers. The
first mapper receives the output from the first phase and sends one key-value
pair to the reducer for each document in the list ksimi, in which docId is the
key and the tf-idf score vector of the document in ksimi is the value. Thus,
the output of the first mapper is of the form, (docIdQ,〈docIdD : Sc〉).
The second mapper also works in a similar way. It receives the pair,
where the key is the similar document identifiers 〈docIdD, docIdQ〉 and the
value is the corresponding similarity. The mapper parses the docIdQ and
docIdD. After this step, it exposes the docIdQ as a key and Sc prefixed with
docIdD as a value. The output of this mapper is also of the form, (docIdQ,
〈docIdD : Sc〉).
The last step in the algorithm is to get all the candidate documents and
select the top-k similar documents among them. The reducer receives the
docIdQ key from the previous mappers and a list of documents that con-
tain the same key (i.e term) as the value. Here, the list is sorted and the
first k documents with the highest similarity values are considered as the
top-k similar documents. The final result of this reducer is of the form,
(docIdQ, {〈docIdD : Sc〉}). Figure 4.3 visualizes the Join phase of the out-
puts of Examples 2 and 3, where the details are given in Algorithm 3.
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Figure 4.3: An Example Execution of ZOLIP Phase 3
Algorithm 3 Join Phase
procedure Map1(docId, 〈〈ksim,Sc〉 , (yes, no)〉)
. this mapper will reads phase 1 output
docIdQ← docId
for all docIdD ∈ ksim do
sendToReducer(docIdQ, 〈docIdD : Sc〉)
end for
end procedure
procedure Map2(〈docIdQ : docIdD〉 ,Sc))
. this mapper will reads phase 2 output
sendToReducer(docIdQ, 〈docIdD : Sc〉)
end procedure
procedure Reduce(docIdQ, {〈docIdD,Sc〉})
topK ← Sort(docIdD,Sc)
expose(docIdQ,topKSimilar)
end procedure
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4.2.4 R-S Join
The R-S join is used to find k most similar documents for a batch of query
documents, which are not a part of the data set. The algorithms given above
are described mostly for self join operation that finds top k similar documents
for every document from the same data set. In order to adapt the proposed
algorithms for R-S join operations, we need to label documents with “Q:”
and “D:”. Also, several simple modifications are necessary to the algorithm
steps. As the modifications are only minor and straightforward, we do not
include separate algorithms for R-S join operations.
The time complexity of the R-S join depends on the number of documents
in the query set and an R-S join usually requires much less time than the
self join since the number of the queried documents is expected to be much
lower than the number of documents in the data set. We analyze the effect
of the query size by testing the algorithm on queries with various number of
documents in the next section.
4.3 Experiments
In this section, we first describe the system model and the data sets used in
our experiments. Then, we compare the proposed method with the method
by Vernica et al. [1]. The proposed method is tested with different param-
eter settings to show its efficiency and scalability in the big data context.
Finally, we discuss the accuracy of our method and the effect of increasing λ
parameter on its accuracy and efficiency.
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4.3.1 Setup and Data Description
We used the Cloudera CDH4 installation with a 3-node cluster: Two nodes
with Xeon processor E5-1650 3.5 GHz of 12 cores, 15.6 GB of RAM and 1 TB
hard disk; and one node with Core i7 3.07 GHz of 8 cores, 15.7 GB of RAM
and 0.5 TB hard disk.On each node, Ubuntu 12.04 LTS, 64 -bit operating
system is installed and Java 1.6 JVM is used. We used the default Cloudera
DFS block size (i.e., 128 MB), so the data is partitioned into 128 MB blocks
and a mapper is assigned to each block. As the system is assumed to have
no a priori knowledge about the size of the queries, no additional partition
is applied before assigning data blocks to mappers. Note that, the data and
the query sets are stored in different data blocks in the DFS.
The outputs of the mappers are sent to the reducer directly without any
additional combiner function. Note that, query elements labeled with “Q” are
compared with data elements labeled with “D”. As the types of the outputs of
query and data mappers are different, aggregate calculations using combiner
operation after mapping are not possible.
In our experiments, we used primarily the Enron data set [34] which is
a data set of real e-mail files. The data set consists of 510, 000 e-mail files,
which is equivalent to a total of 2, 686, 224 KB data. The size of the files are
ranged from 4 KB to 2 MB. First, the data is cleaned from the mail headers
and stop words. The terms are stemmed to their roots using the snowball
stemmer included in the Lucene [35], which is an open source library for
information retrieval. We, then, calculated the tf-idf values of each term
in each file. Finally, we created the sparse vectors of tf-idf values, which
represent the documents. For the Enron data set, the resulted sparse vectors
have 30, 000 dimensions (i.e., terms) with an average density of 160/30, 000.
The density is defined as the ratio of the number of terms with non-zero
43
1000 10000 510000 (SJ)
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
num of query records
ti
m
e
(s
)
λ = 8
Vernica et al.
Figure 4.4: Performance Comparison between the Proposed Algorithm (ZOLIP)
and the Method by Vernica et al. [1] for k = 10.
scores over the total number of terms in the data set [14].
Additionally, to observe the performance of the algorithm on a different
data set, we used the Reuters data set [36], which consists of 20, 000 news
records of 28 MB, with a dictionary size of 136 terms.
4.3.2 Performance Analysis
The performance of our algorithm is compared with the performance of the
algorithm proposed by Vernica et al. [1]. Figure 4.4 shows the absolute
running times of our implementations of the two algorithms for various query
set sizes on the Enron data set for top 10 results (i.e., k = 10). As the size
of the Enron data set is very large, which is overwhelming for a small three-
node Hadoop cluster used in the experiments, the Java heap memory suffers
from the huge amount of joins for the algorithm in [1]. Hence, the timing
results for the self join case for Vernica’s method is omitted in our work. A
possible solution for this problem is to use a larger cluster with more nodes.
We conducted different experiments to observe the effects of different
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Figure 4.5: Effect of Increase in λ on Efficiency for k = 10
parameter settings on the performance of the proposed method. The per-
formance of the method for different values of λ is illustrated in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5 demonstrates that for small values of λ the effect of query size is
very low. However, for λ ≥ 8 search time drastically increases as query size
increases, which is due to the significant increase in the number of join op-
erations (i.e., similarity calculation between a pair of documents). A trivial
remedy to decrease the computation time is to utilize a stronger cluster with
more nodes.
Figure 4.6 shows the running times of each phase, namely NDD, CIT and
JP, for different query set sizes. We observed that, the running time of the
CIT phase increases with the number of queried documents which is expected
as this phase is the main part of the algorithm where all the documents that
share a common important term is compared. The NDD phase is constant
with the number of queried documents. Although the complexity of this
phase is linear with respect to the dictionary size (δ), it performs constant
as we use a static data set. We also analyze the effect of the increase in
k on the efficiency of the method and illustrate the results in Figure 4.7.
As the figure illustrates, k does not have a major effect on the similarity
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search time. The reason for that, independent of k, given a query document
our algorithm calculates the similarity scores with all other documents that
share an important term with the query document and then selects the top
k results. However, if the first phase (NDD) succeeds in finding k or more
results then the second phase is not executed; hence the algorithm may
perform better for small values of k.
Generally, from our experiments we observed that the similarity of the
documents that are returned from the first phase (i.e., near duplicate detec-
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Figure 4.8: Running Times for the Reuters data set for λ = 8.
tion phase) with the query documents (i.e., Sc(q, di)) are over 80 %. However,
this similarity depends on the nature of the data set used as well as the pa-
rameter setting of λ.
The Enron data set is composed of e-mails, which tend to contain du-
plicate parts, e.g., e-mails written using a common template, which may be
advantageous for the first phase (NDD) of our algorithm. Therefore, we also
analyzed the performance of our algorithm using the RCV1 (Reuters Corpus
Volume 1) data set, which is a corpus of news wire stories that is made avail-
able by Reuters, Ltd. [36]. This data set has about 20, 000 data elements
which is much smaller than the Enron data set. The running times of each
phase are demonstrated for the Reuters data set in Figure 4.8.
From Figure 4.8, it can be observed that although the Reuters data set is
much smaller than the Enron data set, the search times are almost equivalent
(cf. the running time for the Enron data set in Figure 4.6). This is due to
the fact that, there are only a few near duplicate documents in the Reuters
data set. While in the Enron data set, 12% (120 out of 1000 queries) of the
search operations can be addressed using only the NDD phase using k = 2,
this value reduces to 1.1% (11 out of 1000 queries) in the Reuters data set.
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4.3.3 Accuracy Analysis
In this section, we analyze the accuracy of our algorithm and the trade-off
between performance and accuracy. We define the accuracy of our method
using the so-called ground truth, where the k-most similar document output
of the proposed scheme is compared with the actual k-most documents calcu-
lated using the full tf-idf scores in the data set. The ratio of the cardinality
of the intersection of both sets to k is defined as the accuracy rate of the
algorithm. The corresponding accuracy rate of Vernica’s [1] algorithm is 1.0
as they used the PPJoin and PPJoinn+ [11], which is an exact similarity
searching algorithm.
The parameter λ determines the accuracy rate of the proposed method.
Let emax be the number of bits required to represent the maximum tf-idf
value in the data set and in the query set. In the proposed method during
filtering, each tf-idf value is represented by only the most significant λ bits.
Therefore, the tf-idf values that are less than 2emin , where emin = emax − λ,
are considered as zero in the ZOLIP filtering algorithm.
Generally, we have two types of errors that lead to loss of accuracy. In
the first type, all the terms of a document have tf-idf values less than 2emin .
Since the terms are all filtered out, no similar document can be found for the
documents with very low tf-idf values. In the second type, as the terms can
only be partially represented after the filtering, there can be inaccuracies in
the returned k-similar matches.
Let Nge be the number of documents in the query set that have at least
one non-zero tf-idf value in the λ-th iteration of Z-order (i.e., having at least
one term with tf-idf value greater than 2emin − 1). As those documents have
at least one important term that is represented after the filtering, they are
free of the errors of the first type. Therefore, we can formulate the rate of
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the documents, for which no similar documents can be found (i.e., type 1
error) as:
ErrType1 =
|Q| − Nge
|Q|
, (4.1)
where |Q| is the number of documents in the query. Note that, as λ in-
creases, more documents are represented in the λ-th iteration on Z-order,
which increases the accuracy.
In the second type of error, the results are not exactly the same as the
actual k-similar documents in the ground truth. There are again two possible
causes for those errors. In the first case, the first phase (NDD) outputs
more than k documents. The matches found are, indeed, highly similar to
the queried document as they are detected in the Near Duplicate Detection
phase. However, the ordering can be different than the actual one in the
ground truth and hence, we will miss some of the actual documents among
the topmost k documents. Note that, such an error does not occur if NDD
phase outputs less than or equal to k results.
The second case are related to the type-1 errors. There may be some
documents in the data set that should actually be in the k similar list of
a query, but missed in our method due to their low tf-idf scores. As the
proposed method is a filtering technique, the final result can only be an
approximation to the actual result given in the ground truth.
We tested the accuracy of the method using queries of 10, 000 documents
compared with the Enron data set of 510, 000 documents. Table 4.1 shows the
average number of missed queries (i.e., type-1 error) for the cases of λ = 4, 6
and 8. Note that, the error rate significantly decreases as λ increases.
Table 4.2 shows the average accuracy of the method for the queries that
returns a result, which are the types of queries, for which type-1 error does
not occur.
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λ 4 6 8
Missed Queries 4309 2466 895
Average of Missed Queries 43% 25% 9%
Table 4.1: Average of missed queries of ZOLIP Filtering Algorithm with k = 2.
λ 4 6 8
# Queries with Inaccurate Top k 11 144 327
Accuracy 99% 98% 96%
Table 4.2: Accuracy of the top k documents for ZOLIP Filtering Algorithm with
k = 2.
We noticed that, none of the documents for which no similar documents
is found, has a term that contains a tf-idf value that appears in the λ-th it-
eration Z-order. Therefore, the results confirm the formula in Equation (4.1)
for average type-1 error rate.
The same accuracy analysis are also performed for the Reuters data set
for λ = 4, 6 and 8 with k=10, and 10, 000 documents, where the results are
provided in Table 4.3.
λ 4 6 8
Average of Missed Queries 13% 12.5% 11%
Accuracy 99% 98% 96%
Table 4.3: Accuracy of the top-k documents for ZOLIP Filtering Algorithm with
k = 2.
The average type-1 error rate can be decreased by increasing the value
of Nge, which can be achieved by increasing λ. However, the increase in λ,
deteriorates the performance of the method as documents that do not contain
important terms would also be compared with the queried documents.
In order to decrease type-1 error rate for the query documents that do
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not have any representation in the λ-th iteration Z-order, we boost the term
with the highest tf-idf value so that document can now be represented in
the λ-th iteration Z-order. A similar approach is adopted also for the second
case of type-2 errors by boosting the tf-idf values of documents that cannot
be represented.
Let B be the boosting factor and let ti,max be the maximum tf-idf value
of document i. Then, B is defined as B = 2emin/ti,max. Note that, only the
term with the maximum tf-idf value is boosted and all the other values re-
main the same. We tested the effectiveness of the proposed boosting method
using λ = 8. While the original method has 895 false matches over 10, 000
queries, the boosted method has 891 false matches which provides only a
slight improvement in the number of missed queries. However, the search
time is almost doubled. The reason for this degradation in performance is
that, the documents that do not initially appear in the λ levels, (i.e., all the
tf-idf values are very small) appear in the boosted version, which significantly
increases the required number of comparisons.
Generally, in any data set, it is difficult to find the similarity for the
documents that do not contain keywords with sufficiently high tf-idf values
by using the cosine similarity techniques. For such a document, the Jaccard
similarity metric may perform better than the cosine similarity based ap-
proaches. The proposed ZOLIP method provides efficient and very accurate
results especially in data sets that contain longer documents with several
important terms.
We also consider the effect of the increase in k on the accuracy of the
method. We applied the ZOLIP filtering algorithm with λ = 8 and we set
k = 10 to check if it reduces the accuracy of our filtering algorithm. The
increase in k does not affect the accuracy in any significant manner, as shown
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in Table 4.4.
k 2 5 10
wrong k-Similar 327 384 433
Accuracy 96% 95.6% 95.2%
Table 4.4: Accuracy of ZOLIP Filtering Algorithm with Different Values of k
when λ = 8.
We also measured the accuracy of the method using Relative Error on
the Sum of distances(RES) [37] metric. Let Sq,k, be the top-k similar result
from a query q. And let also Gq,k be the ground truth of the top-k similar
documents, then RES is defined as
RES(q, Sq,k) =
∑
x∈Sq,k
Sc(q, x)
∑
y∈Gq,k
Sc(q, y)
− 1.
RES is calculated for the Enron data set with 10, 000 queries, using λ = 8,
and k = 2, 5, 10. Table 4.5 shows the relative error values after removing the
queries with type-1 error from the calculations.
k 2 5 10
RES 0.0262 0.0216 0.0178
Table 4.5: Relative Error on the Sum (RES) for Different Values of k when λ = 8.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose an efficient filtering method based on the Z-
order prefix that can be used in document similarity algorithms with cosine
similarity metric. The algorithm provides effective and efficient results. In
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particular, it is very fast in returning highly similar documents. We demon-
strate that our method performs much better than the algorithm in [1] for the
cases, where the density of the vectors is relatively high. This is especially
true when the variance in the tf-idf values are high. This is a general obser-
vation in data sets, in which majority of the documents can be represented
accurately with only several terms of relatively high tf-idf values.
On the other hand, our algorithm have some limitations for documents, all
of whose terms have very low tf-idf values. The documents with terms of very
low tf-idf values, however, imply that they cannot be accurately represented
by a particular subset of terms. Therefore, a filtering based on important
terms do not produce accurate results for those kinds of documents. Instead,
we propose to use a hybrid filtering method based on the Jaccard similarity
metric for documents with no important terms while our filtering technique
can be used for the documents with at least several important terms.
The proposed method provides results with very high accuracy if the ac-
curacy parameter λ is set to a large value. However, for relatively small
values of λ, the search time significantly decreases while still satisfying rea-
sonable accuracy. There is a trade off between accuracy and efficiency, hence
the accuracy parameter λ should be set according to the requirements of the
application and the data set. For instance, in finding highly similar docu-
ments in applications such as duplicate web site and plagiarism detection, a
relatively small values of λ can produce results with high accuracy.
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Chapter 5
SECURE DOCUMENT
SIMILARITY SEARCH
UTILIZING SECURE
SKETCHES
This work considers the problem of detecting the identifiers of the most
similar documents within an encrypted data set for a given query document,
without revealing the features (i.e. terms) of neither the data set elements
nor the query document [38]. In order to apply secure search, a metadata
called sketch is used. The sketches can hide the feature information of the
underlying data but still preserve similarity properties. Prior to outsourcing,
a sketch per data set entry is generated by the data owner, and the search is
applied over the sketches without using the encrypted data itself.
We provide two approaches with different privacy guarantees. The first
one uses the sketches as is and provide very efficient search capability. While
this method can perfectly hide the features of both documents and the query,
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search and access patterns are allowed to leak. Although these patterns are
also allowed to leak in the majority of the other works in the literature,
they may leak considerable sensitive information especially in the existence
of some background knowledge [39]. Hence, we also propose an approach
with enhanced security properties such that both search and access patterns
are hidden in addition to the document and query features. The approach
with enhanced security requires encrypted sketches, which utilizes costly ho-
momorphic encryption techniques.
The rest of the work is organized as follows. Problem definition is given
in Section 5.1. An introduction to our algorithm and the approaches used in
this chapter is described in Section 5.2. Our secure sketch constructions are
provided in Section 5.3. Enhanced security search described in Section 5.4.
Security analysis are given in Section 5.5 Section 5.6 provides the imple-
mentation details of the algorithm utilizing map reduce computation model
over the Hadoop distributed file system (HDFS) and Section 5.7 shows the
experimental results. Finally, Section 5.8 concludes the work.
5.1 Problem Definition
In this section, we formalize the secure similarity search problem and provide
the definitions and tools that are used throughout the chapter. The com-
mon notations that are used extensively in this chapter are summarized in
Table 5.1.
Definition 9 (Secure k-Similarity Search (SSS)) Let D be the outsourced
data set and d1, . . . , dn be the n records in D and Q =< q1, . . . , qm > be a
query with m features (i.e., attributes). Further let Esk be an encryption
method with key sk. Then, secure similarity search (SSS) protocol is defined
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Table 5.1: Common Notations
D data set.
Q query set.
di i
th document in the data set.
qi i
th query document in the query set.
Sk(di) secure sketch for document di
λ size of the sketch.
δ number of terms in the data set.
vi random vectors of {−1, 1}
with δ elements.
dcos, dham cosine and hamming distances.
⊕S secure xor operation
as:
SSS(Esk(D), Esk(Q))→< d
′
1, . . . , d
′
k >,
where d′i is the identifier of the i
th nearest record to Q in D.
Definition 10 (Data Confidentiality) Given a k-similar document pro-
tocol, let D be the data set outsourced to the cloud. An SSS protocol provides
data confidentiality if the contents of the documents di ∈ D are not revealed
to the cloud server.
Definition 11 (Query Privacy) Given an SSS protocol, let Q be a query
that its similar documents are searched for. An SSS protocol provides query
privacy if the features of Q are not revealed to the cloud server.
Definition 12 (Similarity Pattern Privacy) Given an SSS protocol, let
Q and Q′ be two queries that their similar documents are searched for. An
SSS protocol provides similarity pattern privacy if it is not possible for an
adversary, including the cloud, to detect whether the queries contain a subset
of common features or not.
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Definition 13 (Access Pattern Privacy) Given an SSS protocol, let Q
be a query that its similar documents are searched for. An SSS protocol
provides access pattern privacy if access records corresponding to the k most
similar documents of Q is not revealed to any party other than the owner of
the query.
5.2 Secure Similarity Search
In this section, we present our secure search scheme based on locality sensi-
tive hash (LSH) functions. We consider the data outsourcing scenario, where
the data is outsourced to an honest but curious cloud server. As the data
may contain sensitive information, a secure metadata called sketch is gener-
ated using the original data and only the metadata (i.e., secure sketches) is
shared with the cloud. We construct two different search schemes. The first
one shares the sketches with the cloud in the plain form hence all the cal-
culations can be performed very efficiently. But this scheme may leak some
valuable information such as the access pattern. The second approach shares
encrypted sketches. While this scheme provides very high level of privacy,
the computation cost is significantly higher due to bit-wise homomorphic
encryption operations.
In the first scheme, there are three entities namely: data owner, multiple
users and an honest but curious cloud server. In the case of the second scheme
that uses encrypted sketches, in addition to those three entities there is also a
second honest but curious server that we call proxy. Initially, the data owner
encrypts the data and creates searchable sketches and then, outsources the
sketches to the cloud. Given a query, the cloud server calculates the list of
similar documents (with the help of the proxy in the second approach) and
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returns a list of the identifiers of the most similar documents.
5.3 Secure Sketch Construction
The aim of using sketches is to represent documents by small, constant length
binary vectors. While the sketches obfuscate the content (i.e., features) of
the documents, it is still possible to estimate the similarity of the underlying
documents from the sketches only [29]. The sketches are generated using the
principle of locality sensitive hashing (LSH). In LSH functions, different from
the cryptographic hash functions, similar inputs provide the same output
with high probability and dissimilar items provide different outputs with
high probability.
Our method is based on the cosine distance between document pairs. We
represent each document feature set as a point on spaces that have multiple
dimensions such that each feature is represented by an axis and the tf-idf
score of that feature is its value in that axis. The cosine distance between
two points is the angle that the vectors to those points make. Note that, in-
dependent from the number of dimensions (i.e., features), the cosine distance
will be in the range 0 to 180.
Suppose we have two vectors x and y and pick a random hyperplane
through the origin. The hyperplane intersects the plane of x and y in a line.
Consider a vector v that is normal to the hyperplane. Either x and y will
be on different sides, which means vx and vy have different signs, or they
will be on the same side, meaning vx and vy have the same sign. Since the
hyperplane is chosen randomly, with θ/180 probability vx and vy will have
different signs, where θ is the angle between x and y. Note that, the higher
the similarity of two vectors (i.e., smaller θ), the higher the probability that
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they have the same sign, which is in parallel with the principle of LSH.
Let the size of the feature list which is the number of all the possible
keywords in the data set, be δ. In the construction of the sketches, first a
collection of λ vectors, (v1, . . . , vλ), with δ dimensions are chosen, where the
elements of the vectors are randomly chosen as either +1 or −1. Given a
document vector di, the inner product of di with each vector vj is calculated
and the elements of the sketch of di are set according to the signs of those
inner products. The sketch of di, which is a binary vector that is denoted as
Sk(di) = {si1, . . . , siλ}, is constructed as follows:
Sk(di) = {si1, . . . , siλ},
sij =


1 if divj ≥ 0,
0 otherwise.
Note that, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , λ} and ∀di, dj ∈ D,
prob (Sk(di)[k] = Sk(dj)[k]) = 1−
dcos(di, dj)
180
.
This implies that, if di = dj then Sk(di) = Sk(dj) and the number
of common sketch elements gets higher as the cosine distance between the
corresponding documents gets smaller.
Then, we formally define the similarity (S) of two documents di, dj as
follows:
S(di, dj) = λ− dham(Sk(di), Sk(dj)), (5.1)
where dham denotes the hamming distance.
This approach successfully hides the information of features and their
corresponding scores. However, the generation of sketches is a determinis-
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tic operation. Therefore, the server may identify if a document is queried
multiple times or may learn the identifiers of the documents in a query’s
similar document list. Those are the similarity pattern and access pattern
information respectively. This approach is very efficient and can especially
be used in scenarios, where the response time is crucial but the leakage of
search and access patterns may be acceptable. Indeed, most of the works in
the literature of secure search, allows the leakage of these two patterns for
efficiency concerns.
The next section explains the construction of encrypted sketches, which
also hides the search and access patterns but performs slower due to the
complex bit-wise homomorphic encryption operations.
5.4 Enhanced Security
The secure sketches obfuscates the information of the features in the docu-
ments since each bit of a sketch in calculated by multiplying the document
feature vector with a random vector and then reducing the result to a single
bit by just using its sign. However, the sketch construction is a deterministic
operation. Therefore, the same collection of λ random vectors is used in the
construction of the sketches for all documents in the data set. Determinis-
tic construction reveals the similarity pattern, namely server can learn if the
same feature vector is queried before. Moreover, since the sketches are stored
in plain in the server, the server can learn the identifiers of the documents
that are similar with the queried document, which is the access pattern.
In order to hide both search and access patterns, we encrypt the sketches.
However, since the server should apply a similarity search operation, an ho-
momorphic encryption method is used. Homomorphic encryption methods
60
can perform some operations over the encrypted data without knowing the
private key. We use the Paillier encryption [40] as the underlying homomor-
phic encryption method. It provides two homomorphic properties, addition
and constant multiplication on field ZN as:
E(a+ b) = E(a) · E(b) mod N2
E(ab) = E(a)b mod N2
As shown in Equation 5.1, the similarity between two sketches is calcu-
lated using the hamming distance.
Hence, in the case of encrypted sketches, the server calculates the en-
crypted similarity using the encrypted hamming distance between the two
encrypted sketches. Note that, hamming distance is just the summation of
the bits of the xor of two binary input vectors. A secure xor operation that
works over encrypted input vectors is explained as follows.
Secure XOR (⊕S)
Note that, XOR operation can be calculated by addition and multiplica-
tion operation as:
a⊕ b = a+ b− 2(ab).
Hence a secure xor on modulo N , denoted with ⊕S, can be calculated as:
E(a)⊕S E(b) = E(a⊕ b)
= E(a) · E(b) · E(ab)N−2. (5.2)
While Paillier encryption provides homomorphic addition, homomorphic
multiplication of two ciphers is not trivial. Homomorphic multiplication with
Paillier requires a second party, that has the decryption key. Although, this
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second server knows the Paillier private key, it does not need to be trusted
as long as the two servers not collude. Algorithm 4 shows the secure multi-
plication method. The server randomizes the two multiplication parameters
by homomorphically adding a random number and sends the randomized pa-
rameters to the second server. The second server (i.e., proxy) decrypts and
multiplies the given two values. Then, it encrypts the results and sends them
back to the first server. Finally, the first server homomorphically subtracts
(i.e., multiply with modular inverse) the blinding factor of the random values
and gets the encrypted multiplication result.
Algorithm 4 Secure Multiplication (E(ab))
procedure P1(a,b)
pick random r1, r2 mod N
a′ = E(a)× E(r1) = E(a+ r1)
b′ = E(b)× E(r2) = E(b+ r2)
end procedure
procedure P2(a′, b′)
D(a′) = a+ r1
D(b′) = b+ r2
h = D(a′)×D(b′) mod N
. h = ab+ br1 + ar2 + r1r2 mod N
h′ = E(h)
send h′ to P1
end procedure
procedure P1(h′)
E(ab) = h′ × E(a)N−r2 × E(b)N−r1 × E(r1r2)
N−1 mod N2
end procedure
The cosine similarity value can be calculated by using secure xor and
homomorphic addition operations over the sketches. Each element (i.e., bit)
of the sketches are first encrypted with the Paillier encryption method, us-
ing the public key kp as E(Sk(di)) = {E(Sk(di)[1]), . . . , E(Sk(di)[λ])}. The
hamming distance between two encrypted sketches is calculated by first cal-
culating xor of each sketch bit and then applying summation over the results,
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as shown in equation (5.3).
E(dham(Sk(di), Sk(dj))) =
=
λ∑
k=1
E(Sk(di)[k])⊕S E(Sk(dj)[k]). (5.3)
Given the encrypted document sketches Sk = {E(Sk(d1)), . . . , E(Sk(d|D|))}
and a query sketch E(Sk(q)), the server finds the encrypted hamming dis-
tance between the query and each other document. Calculating hamming
distance requires calculating secure xor (⊕S) between encrypted sketches,
which is performed with the participation of the proxy. The encrypted scores
are then shuﬄed by a random permutation given by the user. This shuﬄing
hides the correlation of the scores with the actual identifiers from the proxy.
Since the users choose a random permutation at each query, it is not possi-
ble for the proxy to apply any kind of inference attack. The list of shuﬄed
encrypted scores is then sent to the proxy, which decrypts and sends to the
user. The user applies the permutation back and learns the actual document
identifiers with the minimum hamming distance (i.e., maximum similarity).
The secure similarity search method is described in Algorithm 5.
5.5 Security Analysis
In this section, we provide the formal definitions and proofs that the proposed
scheme is secure.
In the proposed method, both the document and the query sketches are
generated in an identical procedure, hence the definitions data confidentiality
and query privacy are equivalent for this method.
The secure sketch method (without encryption), provides data confiden-
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Algorithm 5 Enhanced Secure Similarity Search
SERVER:
Require: Sk : encrypted document sketches
E(Sk(q)): query sketch, p: random permutation
for all E(Sk(di)) ∈ Sk do
dham = 0
for j = 1→ λ do
dham[j]+ = E(Sk(di)[j])⊕S E(Sk(q)[j]
end for
S(q, di) = dham
end for
shuﬄe encrypted scores S(q, di) ∈ S with random permutation p
send shuﬄed encrypted scores S to proxy
PROXY:
Require: S: shuﬄed encrypted scores
Decrypt each score in S
send scores to user
USER:
apply permutation p on the scores to map with real identifiers
sort scores to find identifiers with min hamming distance
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tiality. Each sketch element sij is just the sign (positive or negative) of the
inner product of document feature list di, with a random vector vj. The
random vectors are secret information, hence not revealed to the server. The
only information leaked from a query or document sketch is the informa-
tion of divj ≥ 0 or not, where vj is random and not known by the server.
Therefore, sij is also random and does not reveal any information about the
content of di.
This method somehow leaks the similarity pattern. Two sketches that
are generated with the same feature lists (i.e., di = dj ) will be the same due
to the deterministic sketch generation operation. However, it is important to
note that, identical sketches do not necessarily imply identical feature lists.
di = dj =⇒ Sk(di) = Sk(dj), but
Sk(di) = Sk(dj) 6=⇒ di = dj.
But if two sketches have high number of common elements, then the prob-
ability that, the two underlying feature lists also have common elements, is
high.
Similarly, the access pattern is also leaked. Since the server can calculate
the similarity score between the query and the documents, the information
of the k most similar documents of the query is revealed.
The enhanced method proposed in Section 5.4 provides both similarity
and access pattern privacy in addition to the data confidentiality and query
privacy. Note that, in the method with encrypted sketches, each element is
encrypted with a semantically secure encryption method, which means each
encrypted sketch bit is indistinguishable from a random number. Therefore,
it is not possible to distinguish queries with identical feature sets, hence
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similarity pattern is protected.
In the encrypted sketch method, the server works only on the encrypted
values so cannot learn anything about the scores. Therefore, access pattern
is not leaked to the server. The proxy has the decryption key and calculates
the scores, but in each query, the server shuﬄes the encrypted score list with
a random permutation given by the user before sending to the proxy. Since
users pick a different random permutation at each query, access pattern is
also not revealed to the proxy.
5.6 Implementation
We utilize the MapReduce computing model and the Hadoop framework in
our implementation. We developed two MapReduce phases in our approach.
While the first phase calculates the secure xor operation between the query
sketch and data set sketches, the second phase sums up the results to calculate
the hamming distance.
There are two mappers in the first phase: one for the query and one for the
data set elements. Both mappers read the sketches and generate key - value
pairs by assigning an index to each encrypted sketch bit as key and encrypted
bit as value. The only difference between mappers is that, query and data
set elements are distinguished by a prefix “Q:” and “D:” respectively. The
output of the mappers is in the format < index,D/Q : dj, E(Sj[p]) >, where
p is the index of the encrypted sketch bit of document ζ andD/Q is the prefix
that represents query or data set element. The reducer of the first phase gets
the output of the mappers and combines the values (i.e., encrypted bits) that
have the same key. Then, it calculates the secure xor operation as explained
in equation (5.2). The result of this operation returns the encrypted xor of
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two encrypted sketch bits, in the format;
<< q, dj >,E(Sq[p]⊕ Sj[p]) > .
The second phase calculates the encrypted hamming distance between the
sketches using the output of the first phase. This phase has only a reducer
without a map function. For each document in the data set, the reducer
collects the keys that have the same query-document pair (i.e having the same
q, dj) and then homomorphically calculates the sum of all the encrypted xor
outputs. The result of the summation is the encrypted hamming distance.
Note that, the smaller the distance, the higher the cosine similarity.
5.7 Similarity Evaluation
In this section, we evaluated the accuracy and computation costs of the
secure similarity search methods. The Paillier cryptosystem is used and the
proposed methods are implemented in Java language. The experiments are
conducted on Cloudera CDH4 with a cluster of 3 nodes. Two nodes with
Xeon processor E5-1650 3.5 GHz with 12 cores 15.6 GB of RAM and 1 TB
hard disk and one node with Core i7 3.07 GHz with 8 cores, 15.7 GB of RAM
and 0.5 TB hard disk. On each node, Ubuntu 12.04 LTS, 64 -bit operating
system is installed and Java 1.6 JVM is used.
The Enron data set [34] is used to evaluate our system which is a col-
lection of 510, 000 real e-mail files. The size each file changes from 4 KB to
2 MB. First, the data is cleaned from the mail headers and stop words. The
terms are stemmed to their roots using the snowball stemmer included in
the Lucene [35] library. We then, calculated the tf-idf values of each term in
each file and created the sparse vectors that represent the documents and the
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corresponding tf-idf values. Finally the sketches are generated using these
sparse vectors and outsourced to the cloud.
The sketching method used in our protocol provides an estimation for
the similarity. The accuracy of the method is measured by comparing the
size of the intersection set of the top-k results returns from our protocol and
the actual top-k results for different values of k that ranges from 5 to 20.
Note that, the accuracy of the method increases as the size of the sketches
increase. However, this also immediately increases the computation costs.
Fortunately, as Figure 5.1 shows, the accuracy is high even for moderate
sketch sizes.
We evaluated the computation costs of both sketch search and encrypted
sketch search methods. As expected, the sketch search is very efficient. The
computation of k most similar documents of a query among the whole data
set of size 510, 000 documents is in the order of seconds as shown in Figure 5.2.
We also evaluated the computation costs for the enhanced security case.
In this case each sketch bit is encrypted with the Paillier encryption for 512-
bit key size. As can be observed from Figure 5.3, the running time grows
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Figure 5.3: Time Complexity for Encrypted Sketch Similarity Search
linearly with sketch size and data set size. However, the requested number of
similar items k, has no effect on the running time. The method sorts all the
documents according to its relevancy with the query document and returns
the top k results.
Most of the works in the literature consider the problem of similar docu-
ment detection among two parties, where one party compares its plain data
with the encrypted data of the second party. However, this problem is not
suitable for the data outsourcing scenario that we consider. The only work
that provides equivalent security properties with our work is the secure k-
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nearest neighbor search, by Elmehdwi et al. [25]. That work also considers
the data outsourcing scenario with hiding search and access pattern but for
a structured data set for attributes with numeric values. They also uti-
lize two servers similar to our approach but finds Euclidean distance in-
stead of the cosine distance we consider. The protocol in [25] is bounded by
O(n∗ (l+m+k ∗ l ∗ log2 n) encryption and exponentiation operations, where
n is the data set size, m is the number of attributes, l is the domain size (in
bits) of Euclidean distance in data set and k is the number of top similar
items. Our protocol does λ secure XOR operations and λ− 1 homomorphic
addition operations per each data record comparison. Each secure XOR has
1 exponentiation and 2 multiplication operations (i.e., constant) hence, the
protocol is bounded by O(n∗λ) where, λ is constant. Since our protocol is in-
dependent from k and the number of features, it outperforms [25], especially
for large values of k.
5.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we address the secure similar document detection problem
for cosine similarity, using locality sensitive hash functions. Our approach is
based on creating a fixed length sketch per each document. We considered
two different security levels. The basic method uses plain sketches and pro-
vides a very efficient implementation. The other method enjoys an enhanced
security protection by using encrypted sketches, where each sketch element
is encrypted with Paillier encryption method. The security analysis of both
methods are provided and the efficiency and effectiveness of the method is
demonstrated through extensive set of experiments. Generally,the First level
shows some applicability for using the algorithm in the mean time, while the
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other secure algorithm shows good theoretical accuracy, unfortunately it still
inapplicable in the present.
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Chapter 6
SECURE DOCUMENT
SIMILARITY SEARCH
UTILIZING MINHASH
In this chapter, we adapt an existing secure searchable indexing method to
k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) for documents. Throughout the chapter we refer
the method also as a method for finding top-k similar documents or document
similarity search. In the method, the document similarity search is handled
in a privacy-preserving manner. The method uses locality sensitive hashing
(LSH) together with homomorphic encryption to construct a searchable index
that allows secure search operations while the actual data itself is protected
using symmetric encryption against an adversary including especially the
cloud storage. More specifically, the proposed method provides data and
query confidentiality.
The method is implemented using MapReduce parallel programming frame-
work on a Hadoop cluster of three computers. The implementation results
show that it can effectively be used in moderate sized data sets and it is
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scalable for much larger data sets provided that the number of computers in
the Hadoop cluster is increased.
6.1 The Framework
We consider a data outsourcing scenario that consists of three entities: data
owner, two non-colluding semi-honest servers and query users. The big pic-
ture for the interactions between the entities is illustrated in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: The framework
Data Owner is a person or organization that owns a data set and wants
to outsource the database functionalities along with the data to the cloud.
Since the data may contain sensitive information, it is encrypted prior to
its outsourcing to the cloud. Beside the encrypted data, a searchable index
is also generated by the data owner for enabling secure search operations
and shared with the cloud. It is important to note that, searchable index
and encrypted data are outsourced to two different non-colluding servers as
explained subsequently.
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Cloud Server is a party that offers storage and computational services.
We assume the cloud servers are semi-honest (i.e., honest but curious), a
common model for cloud environment. In our settings we utilize two non-
colluding servers: file server and search server.
The search server takes a query from a user, applies the requested search
operation over the secure index and returns encrypted intermediate results
to the file server. Then, the file server decrypts and sorts them and send the
final results to the user. The aim of using two non-colluding servers is to
hide the correlation between the queries and final results. The search server
learns the queries, but not what they match with. Similarly, the file server
learns the requested data but not the query itself.
Users are the authorized entities that have the right to query the cloud
data. A user employs certain cryptographic techniques to protect the query
confidentiality. A query generated in this manner is then sent to the search
server. The user receives the search results from the file server.
We can formalize the secure operations over the encrypted data as follows.
Let D be a database with n data records and F be the set of all features
(terms or words), which are included in data entries or queries. There are
five main phases in the method, namely: Setup, Trapdoor Generation, Index
Generation, Query Generation and Search.
1. Setup (ψ): Given a security parameter (ψ), it generates a symmetric
key and a public key pair as K = {Kid, (Kpub, Kpr)}.
2. Trapdoor Generation(∆): Given a list of terms ∆ (i.e., dictionary), it
generates a set of random permutations of ∆ as T = {P1, . . . , Pλ},
where λ is a precision parameter.
3. Index Generation (K,D): Given a database (D), a secure searchable in-
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dex I that represents each entry in D is generated by using the features
of the entries in D and the key K.
4. Query Generation(T , F ): Given the trapdoors T and a set of features
to be queried, it generates a secure query Q for the given features that
does not reveal the corresponding features.
5. Search(I, Q): The given query Q is compared with the searchable index
I and the encrypted matching entries from D are returned.
6.2 Security Model
In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed scheme in passive
adversary model as it is a common adversarial model considered in secure
data outsourcing scenario [41]. We assume the adversary is anyone on the
search server side (e.g., a database administrator) as it is the entity that has
the access to the secure index and secure queries and may try to extract
any sensitive information that may be leaked from them. In this model, the
server is considered honest but curious; i.e., it implements all storage and
processing functions correctly, but learns from any information leak.
The main privacy requirements that need to be satisfied are data and
privacy confidentiality, whose intuitive definitions are given in Definitions 14
and 15. The privacy can further be extended to hide some side information
such as pattern confidentiality. Violation of pattern confidentiality may cause
the system be subject to some adversarial analysis [39]. Although pattern
confidentiality can be provided with oblivious RAM techniques [42] [43], due
to efficiency concerns, we allow to leak that information in this work.
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Definition 14 (Data Confidentiality) A secure search operation provides
data confidentiality if the outsourced data (i.e., encrypted data and searchable
meta-data) does not leak the information of the actual content or features of
the data set elements.
Definition 15 (Query Confidentiality) A secure search operation pro-
vides query confidentiality if the given query does not leak the information of
the actual queried terms or features.
6.3 Proposed Method
This section provides the details of our proposed scheme for the document
similarity search method. Secure search over encrypted data is possible via
a secure searchable index generated by data owner. The search index is then
sent to the cloud server together with the actual encrypted data. While it is
still possible to search for the desired documents, secure index prevents the
cloud service provider (i.e. search server) from learning sensitive information
about the actual data (see Figure 6.1).
6.3.1 Secure Index Generation
In our document similarity searching algorithm, we utilize the bucketiza-
tion technique developed by Kuzu et. al. [44]. Bucketization is a partitioning
technique which distributes each object (e.g., documents in our case) into a
constant number of buckets according to the outputs of the MinHash func-
tions (i.e., signatures). Due to the principle of locality in MinHash functions,
the probability of two documents be assigned to the same bucket is the same
as their Jaccard similarity.
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The main idea of our work is to create a signature based on MinHash func-
tions to represent each document in the data set. The signatures are used to
compare the corresponding documents. The proposed method for construct-
ing the secure index consists of three phases, namely: feature extraction,
bucket index construction and bucket index encryption. These phases, as
illustrated in Figure 6.2 and explained in the subsequent sections, are per-
formed the data owner.
Documents
Feature
Extraction
Bucket Construction
Signatures
Min
Hashing
Bucket
ization
Bucket
Enc.
Secure
Index
Search
Figure 6.2: Flowchart of secure index generation
Feature Extraction
For each data element Di ∈ D feature set Fi = {f
1
i , . . . , f
y
i } is extracted. In
the case of documents of text data, which are used for k-NN search, each
feature is composed of pairs f ji = (wij, rsij), where wij is the word j in doc-
ument i, and rsij is the relevancy score of the term in the corresponding
document. In this work, the tf-idf value is used for relevancy scoring. This
relevancy score is then used to rank the results of the queries in the search
process. Since relevancy scores (rsij) are sensitive information, they are up-
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loaded to the cloud only after encryption. There is a family of cryptographic
algorithms, known as homomorphic cryptosystems, that allow certain oper-
ations to be performed over the encrypted data (ciphertext) and generates
an encrypted result which, when decrypted, matches the result of operations
performed on the plaintext. In order to take advantage of these homomorphic
properties, we use Paillier encryption [40], which is a well known additive ho-
momorphic encryption method. The relevancy scores are encrypted with the
Paillier scheme and all the numerical calculations on the server are performed
over these encrypted values thanks to its homomorphic properties.
In a feature set Fi, there can be several terms with very low relevancy
scores. Representing all those terms with low importance has an adverse
effect on the accuracy of the method, since they may obstruct terms with
high relevancy score in the signature. Therefore, we select only the terms with
tf-idf values higher than a predefined threshold σ (i.e., only the important
terms are used). In the case, where there is no or only very few terms with
tf-idf values higher than σ, we select tmin terms with the highest relevancy
scores.
Bucket Index construction
In the bucket index construction there are two phases. First, using the feature
sets and the MinHash functions, a constant length signature is generated for
each data set entry. Each feature set is hashed with λ MinHash functions,
where each function is under a random permutation Pj of the set of all
possible features ∆. Let Fi be the feature list of document Di ∈ D, then the
signature of Di is calculated as
Sig(Di) = {hP1(Fi), . . . , hPλ(Fi)}. (6.1)
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The signatures are sets of λ elements. An important property of signatures
is that, the similarity between signatures of two data items represents the
similarity of the underlying feature sets of the corresponding data items as
discussed in Section 3.4.
After the generation of signatures, each data item is distributed to λ
different bucket according to their signatures. Let Bik be the bucket identifier
for the ith MinHash with output k, the content vector V Bik is defined as:
(id(Dj), rsjk) ∈ VBi
k
iff Dj ∈ Bik. (6.2)
Note that, independent of the number of its features, each data element
is mapped to exactly λ different buckets, but the total number of different
buckets depends on the set of features ∆, the feature set of each data element
(Fi) and the randomly chosen MinHash functions.
Bucket Index Encryption
Both the bucket identifiers and the bucket content vectors contain some sen-
sitive information, which need to be protected prior to outsourcing. The
bucket identifier represents the MinHash function used and its output. This
may reveal some important information of the input feature set such as the
terms it does not contain and one term that it definitely contains. Therefore,
bucket and query contents should be protected using a cryptographic primi-
tive. However, the server also needs to be able to match the queried encrypted
buckets to the buckets stored in the server. This requirement necessitates
using a deterministic cryptographic scheme for protecting the bucket iden-
tifiers. HMAC functions can be considered as cryptographic hash functions
that take a secret key as input besides the message. We use HMAC functions
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to hide the information that can leak from bucket identifiers. As the process
is deterministic comparison of buckets is still possible. The HMAC secret key
(Kid) is not revealed to the server, hence it is secure against any brute-force
attack. The encrypted bucket identifier is denoted as
piBi
k
= HMACKid(B
i
k). (6.3)
On the other hand, the bucket content vector stores the document iden-
tifiers and relevancy scores of the data elements, which are mapped to that
bucket. In order to get the score of a document, it is required to map the
bucket elements with the same document identifier. Therefore, the docu-
ment identifiers are again hashed with a cryptographic hash function that
is denoted as H(id(Di)). For the relevance scores, we use additive homo-
morphic encryption methods that permit homomorphic addition operation
over the encrypted data without requiring decryption. More specifically, we
use the Paillier encryption scheme [40], which is a very efficient additive ho-
momorphic encryption technique. Formally, Paillier encryption satisfies the
following fundamental homomorphic property,
E(m1, r1) · E(m2, r2) = E(m1 +m2, r3),
where m1 and m2 are two messages and ri values are random numbers.
A public encryption key (Kpub) for the Paillier cryptosystem is used for
encrypting each bucket element before outsourcing the data to the server.
The result of the encryption bucket contents is a list of pairs as
piBi
k
= {(H(id(Dj)), EKpub(rsjk)}∀id(Dj) ∈ B
i
k. (6.4)
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Paillier encryption provides semantic security against chosen plain text
attacks, which means multiple encryptions of the same message result in
different ciphertexts, which cannot be linked. The secure index generation
method is summarized in Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 Secure Index Generation
Require: ∆: set of possible keywords, D: database, h: MinHash function,
Ψ: security parameter
Ensure: I: Secure index for D
1: Kid, Kpub, Kpriv ← Setup(Ψ)
2: L ← ∅ . L: Bucket Identifier List
3: for all Di ∈ D do
4: Fi ← extract features of Di
5: Sig(Di)← {hP1(Fi), . . . , hPλ(Fi)}
6: for j = 1→ λ do
7: Bjk ← Sig(Di)[j − 1]
8: if Bjk /∈ L then
9: add Bjk to L
10: create V
B
j
k
as an empty vector
11: end if
12: add (H(id(Di)), EKpub(rsik) to VBj
k
13: end for
14: end for
15: for all Bjk ∈ L do
16: pi
B
j
k
← HMACKid(B
j
k)
17: add (pi
B
j
k
,V
B
j
k
) to secure index I
18: end for
19: return I
Finally, the data owner outsources the secure index I to the cloud server.
6.3.2 Secure Query Generation
This section explains the query generation process using trapdoors. As in
the case of the index generation phase, we compute a signature for each
document in the query. For sake of simplicity, we assume that the query is a
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document as we search for k most similar documents to the document. The
queried document is indeed represented as a set of terms that have different
tf-idf scores.
Secure query generation is very similar to the index generation process.
As in the flowchart given in Figure 6.2, after feature extraction MinHash
functions are applied on the query terms which create a query signature. Let
the set of query terms be Fq, then the query signature is calculated as
Sig(Fq) = {hP1(Fq), . . . , hPλ(Fq)}.
Using query signature Sig(Fq), the λ buckets corresponding to the query are
determined. The bucket identifiers are then hidden with the HMAC function
used in the index generation phase as
pii = HMACKid(Bi), (6.5)
using the same key Kid of Equation (6.3).
The list of λ bucket identifiers is the secure query. Note that, the same
set of λ MinHash functions are used both in index and query generations.
Therefore, authenticated users need to know the permutations generated in
index generation for MinHash functions. The set of permutations, which is
referred as the trapdoor, is shared with all authenticated users, but hidden
from the both non-colluding cloud servers.
In k-NN search, the tf-idf values of the terms in the query document are
also used in the query generation phase. Recall that, output of a MinHash
function, which determines the corresponding bucket identifier, is one of the
terms in the query set. Therefore, tf-idf value of the output term is used in
the query together with the bucket identifier. However, tf-idf values are also
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sensitive information that may reveal the corresponding term. In order to
hide the tf-idf values in secure queries, we apply an order preserving hashing
(hop) to each tf-idf value such that if x > y then hop(x) > hop(y). The order
preserving function used in the protocol is defined as,
hop(x) =MSBζ(rx+ r2),
where r and r2 are two random numbers (r2 < r) and MSBζ is a function
that returns the most significant ζ bits of the given input. While the same
random r is used for all λ calls of hop for a given query, r2 is randomly
chosen in each call of the function. If a deterministic function were used
for hiding the tf-idf scores, for different MinHash functions that produce the
same output, the corresponding scores would also be the same. This would
eventually reveal that matching buckets contain data elements, which contain
the same term. In order to avoid such leakage, we use a randomized order
preserving function that outputs different, but close values for the same input
with high probability.
The extracted ζ bit values are combined with HMACed bucket identifiers,
resulting a vector of λ pairs as
Vq = {(pi1, hop(rspi1), . . . , (piλ, hop(rspiλ))}.
Algorithm 7 describes the process of query generation.
6.3.3 Secure Search
Search over the encrypted data is in fact performed over the secure index
stored on the search server. As briefly mentioned previously, two non-
colluding servers are employed in the search process, namely search server
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Algorithm 7 Secure Query Generation
Require: F : feature set of keywords to be queried, h: λMinHash functions,
Kid: HMAC key
Ensure: Vq: Secure query
1: for all Dq ∈ Q do
2: Find Sig(F ) for Dq as in Algorithm 6
3: Generate an odd random r
4: for i = 1 to λ do
5: pii ← HMACKid(Sig(F )[i])
6: Generate random r2 < r
7: rspii ← score of Sig(F )[i]
8: hop(rspii)←MSBζ(rrpii + r2)
9: set Vq[i]← (pii, hop(rspii))
10: end for
11: end for
12: return Vq
and file server. While the search server stores the secure index generated by
the data owner as explained in Section 6.3.1, the file server stores the actual
encrypted data elements and knows the private key Kpriv for the homomor-
phic encryption (i.e., Paillier cryptosystem) used to encrypt the relevancy
scores. A user generates a secure query as explained in Section 6.3.2 and
submits it to the search server. The search server works homomorphically
on the secure index and calculates encrypted, unsorted relevancy scores for
the list of the matching results. The encrypted results are then sent to the
file server that possesses the private key of the homomorphic encryption. It
decrypts and sorts the relevancy score list of the matching data items and
sends those encrypted, top matching data items to the user.
Recall that, a secure query is of the form of bucket identifiers protected by
HMAC function. The search server retrieves the buckets given in the query
and homomorphically sums the encrypted scores of each document depending
on their HMACed document identifiers. The query also contains relevancy
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scores, which are first multiplied with the scores of data items in the secure
index and then the homomorphic summation of the results is calculated.
For finding the scores of the same document in different buckets and
summing their relevancy scores, the MapReduce computation framework is
used. The search algorithm consists of two MapReduce phases. The first
phase joins the query elements with the secure index elements. Multiplying
randomized query scores with homomorphically encrypted index scores is
also handled in this phase.
The second phase is responsible for homomorphically summing the scores
of each document from different buckets. While the first phase consists of
two mappers (query and index) and one reducer, the second phase consists
of one mapper and one reducer.
In the first phase, the first mapper (i.e., query mapper) reads the given
query vectors Vq, which contains the HMACed bucket identifiers and the cor-
responding relevancy scores as described in Section 6.3.2. Then, the mapper
redirects each bucket id as a key and the corresponding relevancy score as a
value prefixed with ‘Q :’ to the reducer as
< Dq, Vq >←−< pii, < Q : pii, hop(rspii) >> .
The prefix ‘Q :’ is used to distinguish the pair from those that come from
the secure index.
The second mapper (i.e., index mapper) reads each bucket id and their
contents from the secure index. This mapper extracts the bucket id as a key
and the HMACed data items’ ids inside that bucket with their corresponding
scores as value. Then, for each data item id in the bucket, a replication of
the bucket id is created as a key and its corresponding encrypted score is
included as value. This pair is then redirected to the reducer. This time the
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values are prefixed with ‘D :’ to distinguish them from query bucket records
as follows
< pii, Vj >←−< pii, < D : H(id(Dj)), EKpub(rsij) >> .
The reducer of the first phase receives the elements within the same bucket
(i.e., query elements and secure index elements), and adds them into two
vectors such that documents prefixed with ‘Q :’ are mapped to the query
vector VQ, and documents prefixed with ‘D :’ are mapped to the data vector
VD. Then, the randomized scores in the query vector (i.e., hop(rspii)) are
homomorphically multiplied with the scores of the data items in the data
vector. The output of the first phase combines the data item id pairs (i.e.,
query element id and index element id) as key, and the relevancy scores (e.g.,
encrypted multiplication results) as value. The output of this phase is in the
following format:
<< Q,H(id(Dj)) >, hop(rspii)× EKpub(rsij) > .
In the second phase, the aggregated encrypted score is calculated by sum-
ming the resulting encrypted relevancy scores of the same pairs. In order to
calculate the sum, the mapper only redirects all the key value pairs that
come from the previous phase as they are, without any modification. After
the shuﬄing process, the reducer receives the records that have the same key
(i.e., with the same data item identifier), and the encrypted relevancy scores
for each bucket. Utilizing homomorphic properties of Paillier encryption, en-
crypted aggregated relevancy score (rsAgg) of each data item is calculated.
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The final output of the reducer is in the following format
<< Q,H(id(Dj)) >,EKpub(rsAggj) > .
This list of pairs with encrypted scores are then sent to the file server, which
decrypts and sorts the accumulated relevancy scores. Then the final results
with the highest relevancy scores are sent to the user.
6.4 Security Analysis
In the proposed method, all the actual data items that are stored in the file
server are encrypted with a semantically secure symmetric encryption scheme
(e.g., AES with CBC and CTR modes) prior to outsourcing. Therefore, an
adversary can learn no information using the encrypted data elements. How-
ever, meta-data called the secure index, that is used for applying secure
search operation, is also outsourced together with the encrypted data. The
secure index is a number of buckets where each bucket stores a list of pairs
H(id(Di)), EKpub(rsi) that are mapped to that bucket. Here, H(id(Di)) is
a hashed pseudo identifier for a data element Di and EKpub(rsi) is the cor-
responding relevancy score which is encrypted with the Paillier encryption
scheme. Since the relevancy scores are also encrypted with a semantically
secure encryption method, the encrypted values are indistinguishable from
random numbers and hence do not reveal any information. The only infor-
mation that an adversary may use for an attack is the pseudo identifiers of
the data items.
During the secure index generation process, each data item is mapped
to exactly λ different buckets. Therefore, it is not possible to make any
statistical analysis using the number of occurrences of a pseudo identifier. On
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the other hand, each bucket corresponds to a single feature/term. Therefore,
the number of data item identifiers in each bucket is correlated with the
frequency of the corresponding feature in the whole data set. With high
probability, buckets that correspond to a feature that occurs in larger number
of data elements have larger number of identifiers. However, each feature may
correspond to several (at most λ but can be fewer) different buckets and it
is hard to distinguish feature - bucket identifier correspondence. Moreover,
the secure index and the actual encrypted data elements are stored in two
different and non-colluding servers. The search server, which is the adversary
for our security model, can only access the secure index and therefore cannot
learn the mapping between the actual encrypted data items and their pseudo
identifiers. The proposed method provides data confidentiality as defined in
Section 6.2 since the adversary cannot learn the features of the data items
using the secure index.
In order to enhance the security, a possible patch can be applied to also
hide the actual number of data identifiers in each bucket. This can be done by
adding a number of dummy pseudo identifiers to buckets with fewer number
of elements to perturb the cardinality statistics of the buckets. The relevance
scores of the dummy identifiers should be set to random encryptions of zero,
hence they will be automatically omitted in the top list of relevancy in the file
server side after being sorted based on their relevancy scores. Another impor-
tant point is that each of the dummy identifiers must be assigned to exactly
λ different buckets to make them indistinguishable from genuine identifiers.
Note that, inclusion of extra dummy elements will increase the computation
cost of search operation as aggregated score should also be calculated for
dummy elements using homomorphic addition of encrypted relevancy scores.
Also the communication between search server and file server will increase as
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the encrypted scores of dummy identifiers will also be sent. Another possible
solution to hide this leakage is to include all data element identifiers in the
data set to all the buckets. The corresponding relevance scores will be set
to the encryption of zero if the data item does not originally map to that
bucket. However, this will drastically increase both the computation and
communication costs between the two servers, and hence being impractical.
A search query, independent of the query type, is a list of λ bucket iden-
tifiers. The information leaked to the search server from a query is that the
query contains the features that correspond to the buckets given in the query.
However, as explained for data confidentiality, the bucket identifiers and the
corresponding list of data item pseudo identifiers do not reveal the actual
features. Therefore, the proposed scheme provides query confidentiality.
The queries are generated in a deterministic manner hence different queries
that search for the same set of features will be the same. This leaks the so
called search pattern such that the frequency of the buckets accessed is leaked
to the search server. A query randomization method that hides the search
pattern is proposed and analyzed in [45]. The same approach can also bu
used in this setting with the cost of increasing the storage requirements as
the approach requires utilizing higher number of buckets.
6.5 Experiments
In order to assess the performance of the proposed scheme, we build a small
cluster of 3 nodes and Cloudera CDH4 for cluster management. The cluster
have two nodes with Xeon processor E5-1650 3.5 GHz with 12 cores 15.6 GB
of RAM and 1 TB hard disk and one node with Core i7 3.07 GHz with
8 cores, 15.7 GB of RAM and 0.5 TB hard disk. On each node, Ubuntu
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12.04 LTS, 64 -bit operating system is installed and Java 1.6 JVM is used.
In our experiments, we used the Enron data set [34] for evaluating the
text based operations of the proposed method. This data set contains a
collection of 517, 000 real e-mail files. The size of each file changes from
4 KB to 2 MB. Although the actual data set size is about 200 GB, the size of
the secure index is very small since only the information of bucket identifiers
and corresponding data element identifier and score pairs are stored.
Initially, the entire data set is processed to determine the features of
each data item in what is known as the feature extraction phase. First, the
data set is cleaned from the mail headers and stop words. The terms are
stemmed to their roots using Snowball stemmer, which is a string processing
programming language included in the Lucene [35] library. The tf-idf values
of each term in each e-mail file are then calculated and stored on sparse
vectors. After the feature extraction phase, secure index is generated as
explained in Section 6.3.
For the accuracy experiments we consider two metrics namely precision
and recall. Intuitively, precision is the ratio of correctly found matches over
the total number of returned matches and recall is the ratio of correctly found
matches over the total number of expected results (i.e., the ground truth).
Both precision and recall are real numbers between 0 and 1, where a higher
value means better accuracy.
We assume that the server receives several search requests at any time
which is in line with the big data context. Therefore instead of processing
each query individually, we group 200 individual queries and process a bulk
search for all. Bulk search operations have a great positive effect on the
throughput of the system as the distributed file systems and parallel pro-
graming models do not benefit relatively small number of such operations.
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Figure 6.3: Average precision rates for k-NN search with different λ and k
As the number of terms in queries is significantly many (as a document in
a query can contain many words with relatively high tf-idf scores), a larger
value of λ needs to be used in order to satisfy an equivalent level of accuracy.
Furthermore, both precision and recall metrics are equivalent as the number
of returned matches and the number of actual matches are both equal to k.
We therefore used a single metric, namely precision, to evaluate the accuracy
of the k-NN search method. The accuracy of k-NN search in our experiments
is illustrated in Figure 6.3 for different values of k and λ.
Figure 6.3 demonstrates that increase in λ has a positive effect on accu-
racy as expected due to the properties of locality sensitive hash functions.
Similarly, increase in k has also a positive effect on the accuracy. The pro-
posed method can find the most similar data items (i.e., nearest neighbors)
to the queried item, but possibly in a different order with respect to the ac-
tual results. Therefore, for small values of k, some of the actual most similar
matches may not fall in the top k slots and leads to a negative effect on the
accuracy. However, for relatively larger values of k, most of the top matching
data items are usually accommodated in the top k slot and thus leads to high
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Figure 6.4: Average search time for kNN search with different λ
accuracy rates.
The execution times of k-NN search for different values of λ and k are
illustrated in Figure 6.4.
6.6 Conclusion
In this work, we addressed the problem of applying an existing privacy-
preserving technique for secure document similarity search operation on en-
crypted cloud data. We utilized the secure similarity search method based
MinHash functions. We developed an implementation of the proposed secure
search algorithm for the Hadoop distributed file system and the MapReduce
programming model. We tested the implementation in a three-node Hadoop
cluster with the Enron email data set and demonstrate the effectiveness and
scalability of the system.
Although the timing results are high the proposed method is still promis-
ing in the sense that the method can scale to larger data sets with more
documents provided that more computing nodes in the cluster are available.
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In addition, as more computation power at a reasonable cost will be avail-
able in the future, more secure solutions as proposed in this chapter will be
feasible.
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Chapter 7
EFFICIENT, SECURE
DOCUMENT SIMILARITY
SEARCH UTILIZING
Z-ORDER SPACE FILLING
CURVES
In this chapter, we propose another secure document similarity search method
in a scenario where a database of documents is hosted by a semi-trusted cloud
server. Users submit their queries consisting of documents to the cloud, which
performs a search operation over the database index and returns the most
similar documents to those in the queries. As queries, database and database
index are protected by a symmetric encryption technique, we provide data,
query and index confidentiality. The method is amenable to parallel comput-
ing technologies where database is kept in a distributed file system. Thus, it
is scalable to large databases, which makes it a good candidate for big data
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applications. The experimental results show that proposed method intro-
duces no significant overhead to execution times. However, the effectiveness
of the method is deteriorated due to the trade off between security and accu-
racy. To remedy this, we propose several techniques to improve the accuracy
by allowing local computation in the user side and modifying database index
construction.
7.1 Introduction
Recently, cloud computing became a popular technology for relatively in-
expensive, robust and reliable storage and computation. Providing efficient
and fast computing power at low cost, it compels parties, who are unwilling
to invest their limited budget in hardware, to outsource their data and ap-
plications to cloud services. However, the cloud service providers are usually
considered as semi-trusted entities that may try to learn from the stored
data.
Processing and/or analyzing data over relational databases is an impor-
tant problem that has extensively been considered in the literature for a
long time. However, the security implications had been disregarded, to a
large extent, until recently as data outsourcing was not a common practice.
Therefore, with the increasing use of and reliance on cloud, it is now a ne-
cessity to provide techniques for privacy-preserving processing of data, prior
to outsourcing. Similarity search is one of the foremost problems need to be
addressed when private and/or sensitive data are outsourced to cloud.
More specifically, contents and features (e.g. words) of documents, which
are outsourced, can be private and need to be protected from the cloud service
(the cloud henceforth), which can be done by encryption. On the other hand,
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conventional encryption usually hinders any operation on documents, includ-
ing similarity search, in which documents with similar features are searched.
Therefore, secure and searchable metadata (e.g. index) for the documents
are constructed, which do not leak information about the document contents
and features by itself.
An important requirement of secure search operations is that it has to
scale to massive data/document sets to be expedient in big data applications,
which are the current focus of interest in industry as well as academia.
This chapter considers the problem of determining the most similar doc-
uments in an encrypted data set given a query document, without revealing
the features (i.e. terms, words) of neither the data set elements nor the query
document. Search for similar documents is implemented using a signature
called ZOLIP key which is computed using the document features and their
importance for the document. The essence of the ZOLIP key is that similar
documents, having the same important features, have significant portions of
the key in common. Prior to outsourcing, a ZOLIP key per data set entry is
generated and encrypted by the data owner. Then the search is applied over
encrypted ZOLIP keys without using the encrypted data itself.
The proposed method does not protect search pattern privacy, as ZOLIP
keys are generated deterministically. Therefore, features of same importance
levels can be linked across queries leading to information leak, which can be
exploited given background information and known statistical properties of
the data set. Guaranteeing search pattern privacy is generally considered
as a difficult problem, which can be detrimental for scalability of the solu-
tion. Therefore, we only provide a simpler, but scalable solution for big data
applications.
The work here can be considered as an extension of our work in [33], which
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provides no security, but focuses on fast and scalable document similarity
search solutions. Based on the same theoretical foundation, here we provide
a simple technique to secure documents as well queries.
7.2 Problem Definition
In this section we formulate the problem and present the definitions related
to our proposal for document similarity search operation used throughout
the chapter. The notation used in the chapter is listed in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1: Common Notations
D data set.
Q query set.
di i
th document in the data set.
qi i
th query document in the query set.
Zi ZOLIP key for document di
λ number of Z-order iterations.
δ number of terms in the data set.
vi random vectors of δ elements.
ζ size of signature groups derived from
ZOLIP key
Note that we adopt the terminology and definitions introduced in [33],
which also proposes a document similarity search method, but without any
security properties.
Definition 16 (Secure Similarity Search) Let D be the outsourced data
set and d1, . . . , dn be the n records in D and Q =< q1, . . . , qm > be a query
with m documents. Further let Sige(di) be an encryption for document having
the signature Zi. Also, Sige(D) and Sige(Q) stand for set of signatures for
the data set and the query, respectively. Then, the secure similarity search
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(SSS) protocol is defined as:
SSS(Sige(D), Sige(Q))→< d11, . . . , d1k, . . . , dm1, . . . , dmk >,
where dij is the identifier of the jth nearest document in D to qi ∈ Q.
Definition 17 (Data Confidentiality) Given a k-similar document pro-
tocol, let D be the data set outsourced to the cloud. An SSS protocol provides
data confidentiality if the contents of the documents di ∈ D are not revealed
to the cloud server.
Definition 18 (Query Confidentiality) Given a k-similar document pro-
tocol, let Q be the set of documents in a query. An SSS protocol provides query
confidentiality if the contents of the documents qi ∈ Q are not revealed to the
cloud server.
7.3 Secure ZOLIP Similarity Search
In this section we present the secure version of the ZOLIP algorithm intro-
duced in [33]. Secure similarity search is performed using secure search index
generated by the owner of the data, which is the set of encrypted document
signatures. Data set is also encrypted and uploaded to the cloud along with
the secure search index. This way, the cloud owner is prevented from access-
ing document and query contents, while it is still possible to perform search
for similar documents.
7.3.1 Secure Index and Query Generation
The main idea of our work is to create signatures to represent document in
the data set, which are used to compare documents and determine their sim-
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ilarity. We use ZOLIP keys as document signatures, introduced by Alewiwi,
et al. [33] which are, simply speaking, just bit vectors. The proposed method
consists of two main phases, feature extraction and secure ZOLIP key con-
struction as shown on the left hand side of Figure 7.1.
Documents
Feature
Extraction
Index Generation
Signatures
ZOLIP
Key Con-
struction
Encrypted
Signatures
MapReduce
Search.
Secure
Query
Gen.
Secure Search
Figure 7.1: Flowchart of secure index and query generation
In document similarity, features are words in documents and the feature
extraction phase processes documents and determines the words and their
tf-idf values. As a result, we obtain a sparse vector for each document, in
which non-zero values are tf-idf scores for the corresponding words in the
document. In the second phase, the ZOLIP key is first constructed by bit-
wise interleaving the tf-idf values of important words for the corresponding
document and the resulting bit sequence is stored in a sparse vector.
Let Zi = {b1 . . . bδλ} be the ZOLIP key for document di, where δ is the
number of terms in the dataset and λ is the number of Z-Order iterations.
We partition the ZOLIP key into groups or chunks, each of which contains
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ζ consecutive bits. Then, the ZOLIP key can be written as
Zi = {Z1 . . . Zd δ·λ
ζ
e},
where Zi is a chunk of ζ consecutive bits.
In order to prevent signatures from revealing any information about the
document, its content, the words they contain and their tf-idf scores we
use a deterministic encryption scheme on signature chunks, Zi. For fast
computation and short outputs, we use an HMAC function, which takes a
secret key Ki and the signature chunk Zi for i = 1 . . . d
δ·λ
ζ
e, and returns a
ciphertext block. Consequently, the secure signature of document di is given
as
Sige(di) = {HMAC(K1, Zi,1), . . . ,HMAC(Kd δ·λ
ζ
e, Zi,d δ·λ
ζ
e)}
We use a different HMAC keys for each chunk and a chunk with all-0
bits are ignored. Note also that document id’s are also encrypted. Finally,
the encrypted documents and their encrypted ids and signatures sent to the
cloud.
In the secure query generation operation (see Figure 7.1), the same steps
are applied to obtain encrypted signatures for the documents in the query. In
the next section we describe the document similarity search in more detail.
7.3.2 Secure Search
The secure search operation is composed of three map reduce phases. The
first phase tries to find duplicate and/or near duplicate documents (i.e. two
documents with exactly the same important terms should have the same
ZOLIP key), and it contains two mappers and one reducer.
The first mapper reads and parses the secure index (i.e. the set of en-
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crypted signatures Sige(di) for the entire data set), then it passes the follow-
ing key-value pair
< E(di), Sige(di) >→< Sige(di), D : E(di) >
to the reducer. Here, Sige(di) serves as the key and D : E(di) as the value,
where E(di) is the encrypted document id and the prefix “D” is used to
distinguish the index from the query.
The second mapper reads the secure signatures in the query in a similar
manner. Its output has the same format, except for the fact that the value
part is prefixed with “Q”
< E(di), Sige(qi) >→< Sige(di), Q : E(qi) > .
The reducer of the first phase receives documents sharing the same en-
crypted signature. It groups the documents prefixed with “Q” and documents
prefixed with “D” into two separate sets. For each document in the “Q” set,
it tries to find k similar documents from the “D” set; an operation which
may not be always successful.
If the reducer finds sufficient number of similar documents (i.e. k similar
or near duplicate documents), it returns the encrypted document id as the
key and, as the value, the original encrypted document signature concate-
nated with the list of documents having the same signature as the query
document. The suffix “Y ” is added to the value part indicating that the
search is successful and the desired number of similar documents are found.
The main aim of attaching “Y ” to the result is to avoid the next phase, which
is executed only if the first phase falls short of finding k similar documents.
In the first phase is not successful, the search result contains the prefix
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“N” to signal that we need to move to the next phase. Consequently, the
reducer output of the first phase has the following form
< E(di), < Sige(di), {E(dj)}, (Y/N) >> .
The second phase is also composed of two mappers and one reducer. The
main aim of this phase is to find the documents having signature chunks in
common. The first mapper reads the original encrypted signatures, while
the second mapper reads the output of the first phase. The first mapper
parses chunks of signature values (i.e. HMAC(Kl, Zl) for l = 1, 2, . . . , d
δ·λ
ζ
e),
and then sends chunks as key and encrypted document ids as values to the
reducer. The resulting mapper output has the following form
< E : (di), HMAC(Kl, Zl,1) >→
< HMAC(Kl, Zl,1), D : E(di) > .
The second mapper in this phase reads the output of the first phase and
checks if there are documents not having k similar documents. It parses
the signatures Sige(di) of the encrypted documents with insufficient number
of similar documents and obtains signature chunks HMAC(Kl, Zi,l) for l =
1, 2, . . . , d δ·λ
ζ
e. It then forms the pairs
< HMAC(Kl, Zi,l), Q : E(di) >
and sends them to the reducer.
Documents having the same encrypted signature chunks indicate that
they share some parts of the ZOLIP key and thus possibly sharing some
important terms. Generally, higher number of common signature parts point
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out that the documents are very similar. Upon receiving the outputs of the
mappers, the reducer creates two lists; the query list for encrypted signature
chunks from the query documents and the data set list for those of documents
in the dataset. For each matching chunks from the query list and the data
set list, the reducer forms the following pair
<< E(di), E(dj) >, 1 >,
where the encrypted ids of documents containing the same encrypted chunk
are taken as the key and the integer “1” as the value of the pair.
The last phase is responsible for joining the results of the first and second
phases. Again, this phase has two mappers and one reducer. The first
mapper reads the first phase output, parses the record values with “Y ” and
extracts encrypted document ids. It then concatenates the encrypted query
document id with all the encrypted document ids as a key. The value of this
mapper is another literal value “dδ · λ/ζe′′ (i.e. identical ZOLIP keys as all
signature chunks match). The result of this mapper will have the form
<< E(di), E(dj) >, dδ · λ/ζe > .
The second mapper reads the output of the second phase and redirects it
without any modification to the reducer. In the last step, the reducer of the
last phase reads the pairs of the encrypted document ids. Then for each pair,
the algorithm finds the sum of the value parts from the previous mappers
and outputs them in the form
<< E(di), E(dj) >, sum > .
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The user is sent the output of the last phase sorted depending on the sum
parts of the pair. Here, the value sum for < E(di), E(dj) > gives the number
of common signature chunks in two documents.
7.4 Security Analysis
The actual documents stored in the cloud are assumed to be encrypted with
a semantically secure symmetric encryption scheme (e.g., AES) prior to out-
sourcing. Therefore, the cloud and any adversary that captures them do not
learn much information from the ciphertexts as the secret key is not avail-
able to them. However the secure index, composed of encrypted signatures
and needed for secure search operation, is also outsourced together with the
encrypted documents. The encrypted signatures consist of HMACed ZOLIP
key chunks for documents. The signatures do not give any information about
the terms in the corresponding ZOLIP keys as long as the universal dictionary
is shuﬄed using a random permutation.
Documents having common signature chunks indicate that they possibly
share terms. As the ZOLIP key is grouped as chunks before encryption there
can be false positives, namely documents having common signature may not
share the corresponding terms with certain probability, which depends on the
chunk size. The larger chunk size increases this probability while decreasing
the accuracy due to the increasing number of false positives. False positives
serve as randomizing effect on the secure index as well as on the queries.
This makes the adversary’s job harder as it is difficult to know whether a
document contains a term or not for certain.
In summary, the proposed method provides data confidentiality, since the
adversary can learn neither the terms a document contains nor their scores.
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However, the secure index and queries can give partial information about the
documents such as an idea about the approximate number of important terms
it contains. An adversary, therefore, can differentiate between documents
with many important terms and those with fewer number of important terms.
The queries are generated in a deterministic manner, hence queries con-
taining the same documents can easily be identified. Hence, so called search
pattern is leaked. The proposed method provides only fundamental security
properties, namely data, index and query confidentiality.
7.5 Experimental Results
In order to assess the performance of the proposed scheme, we build a small
cluster of 3 nodes and Cloudera CDH4 for cluster management. The cluster
has two nodes with Xeon processor E5-1650 3.5 GHz with 12 cores 15.6 GB of
RAM and 1 TB hard disk and one node with Core i7 3.07 GHz with 8 cores,
15.7 GB of RAM and 0.5 TB hard disk. On each node, Ubuntu 12.04 LTS,
64 -bit operating system is installed and Java 1.6 JVM is used.
In our experiments, we used the Enron data set [34] for evaluating the
proposed method. This data set contains a collection of 517, 000 real e-mail
files. The size of each file changes from 4 KB to 2 MB. Although the actual
data set size is about 200 GB, the size of the secure index is very small as
only the signatures for ZOLIP key chunks with non-zero values are stored.
We selected Z-order iteration level λ = 8 and similarity level k = 10.
We performed the experiments using unencrypted signature chunks as only
bit string comparisons are needed independent of whether we use encrypted
or unencrypted chunks. As the comparison of bit strings constitutes only a
small portion of the overall execution time and no encryption operation is
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performed in the server side, we did not actually use the HMACed ZOLIP
key. Also, we report only the experimental results for the search operation in
the server side excluding the operations such as feature extraction and query
construction.
Initially, the data is processed in what referred as the feature extraction
phase (see Figure 7.1). In feature extraction, first the data is cleaned from
the mail headers and stop words. The terms are stemmed to their roots using
the snowball stemmer included in the Lucene [35] library. The tf-idf values
of each term in each file are then calculated and stored on sparse vectors.
After the feature extraction phase, secure index and queries are generated as
explained in Section 7.3.1.
The performance and accuracy of the algorithms are measured for differ-
ent values of ζ in our experiments. First, we measured the performance of the
algorithm by measuring the execution time using different ζ values to detect
the effect of increasing ζ over the performance. In our experiments we used
ζ = {2, 3, 4} and employed queries of 1,000 documents assuming that a typi-
cal cloud server receives multiple search requests from many users. Figure 7.2
shows the effect of changing the ζ value on the overall execution time of the
search operation in the server side. The figure shows that larger ζ values
slightly improve the time performance as the number of comparisons of sig-
nature chunks is decreased. When compared with the timing results in [33],
which provides a document similarity search algorithm without any security,
the execution times are comparable for similar experimental settings. On
the other hand, the communication complexity is negatively affected as the
query sizes increase due to encryption of the ZOLIP key.
We also depicted the accuracy of the proposed in Figure 7.3, which shows
that larger values of ζ deteriorate the accuracy. This result is expected as
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the increasing sizes of signature chunks lead to increase in false positives.
Also, the larger chunk sizes will result in documents for which we cannot
find sufficient number of similar documents.
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As seen from the figures, large values of ζ have a significantly negative
effect on accuracy and slight improvement in time performance. Also, from
security point of view large values of ζ has certain advantages as they increase
false positive rates leading to less partial information leak. Therefore, we
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can conclude that there is a trade off between accuracy and security. A
decision for picking the correct ζ depends on the application requirements.
Nevertheless, the experimental results clearly show that only small values of
ζ leads to reasonable accuracy levels.
To increase accuracy, we propose to use larger values of k than specified
in the query and return all documents found after the search to the user.
Then, local computation at user side will become a necessity as the num-
ber of returned documents exceeds the specified k. Also, the user needs to
remove the false positives, namely dissimilar documents. Some client side
computation is acceptable and sometimes desirable from security point of
view as long as the computation requirements are not prohibitively high.
7.6 Conclusion
We present the secure version of a previously proposed document similarity
search method by Alewiwi et al [33]. The method is almost as fast and ef-
ficient as the original method in [33], while there is a trade off between the
security and accuracy. While we can improve the accuracy of the method by
adjusting the chunk size of the document signatures, the original version will
always be better as we introduce additional false positives due to encryption.
As a remedy, the accuracy can further be improved if the algorithm returns
more documents than requested to the user that, in turn performs additional
processing over a limited number of documents. This is acceptable if local
computation is feasible at the user side. Lastly, the method also increases
the query and index sizes, due to the encryption of small chunks of docu-
ment signatures individually. On the other hand, both query and index sizes
remain at acceptable levels as document signatures are sparse bit vectors.
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Chapter 8
CONCLUSION AND
FUTURE WORK
In this thesis, we addressed the secure document similarity problem in the
scenario that document set is outsourced to a honest but curious cloud server.
We targeted applications involving processing of big data, for which any
solution must be efficient and scalable. Therefore, all proposed solutions
feature algorithms that are amenable to parallel computation, hence scalable.
We used the MapReduce parallel programming model due to its simplic-
ity for our parallel implementation of the proposed algorithms. As a parallel
computation platform, we utilized Hadoop framework thanks to its accessibil-
ity and relative ease of use and maintenance. Using MapReduce and Hadoop,
we demonstrated that our algorithms can scale to large sizes of data sets. We
proposed four different solutions for document similarity search: while the
first one provides no security, the other three solutions provide protection,
however, with different security properties. The last solution, in fact, is a
secure version of the first one.
We first proposed an efficient filtering technique for document similarity
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search in Chapter 4. The solution does not provide any security and fo-
cuses on efficiency and scalability of the similarity search operation. As we
used cosine similarity metric to compare documents based on the terms and
their tf-idf values, we obtained good accuracy results. The proposed filter-
ing technique prevents the computation of cosine similarity of two dissimilar
documents, and focusing only on potentially similar documents. The exper-
imental results obtained using two known data sets demonstrate that the
method is promising for big data applications. Although it has limitations
for documents with no important terms, future research can remedy this by
using hybrid solutions.
For secure document similarity search, we developed three algorithms.
The first solution, covered in Chapter 5, considers two different security lev-
els. The basic method uses plain sketches and the other method offers an
enhanced security protection by using encrypted sketches, where each sketch
element is encrypted with the Paillier encryption method. The first algorithm
providing a basic level security is a feasible solution in many applications,
while the other more secure algorithm shows good theoretical accuracy. Un-
fortunately, our experimental results demonstrate that the more secure ver-
sion is not practical due to its heavy computational requirements.
In Chapter 6, we adapted an existing privacy-preserving multi-keyword
search technique for secure document similarity search problem on outsourced
data. More specifically, we utilized MinHash functions, which are used in
the literature [45] [46] for secure multi-keyword search operations in simi-
lar settings. The proposed algorithms offer better security properties if two
non-colluding servers implementing cloud operations are available. The ex-
perimental results are promising as far as execution times and accuracy are
concerned. In addition, they also show that it is possible to reconcile effi-
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ciency and effectiveness of the search method and advanced security features,
at least for moderately large data sets.
The last method given in Chapter 7, is in fact, a secure version of the
algorithm introduced in Chapter 4. To preserve efficiency and scalability
of the original algorithm, the new algorithm offers only basic protection of
document, index, and query privacy, allowing search and access patterns to
leak. The initial experimental results demonstrate that the secure algorithm
has acceptable computational complexity (at least comparable to that of
the original scheme). Nevertheless, it is also clear that the accuracy of the
method should be improved. We suggest a solution to improve the accuracy,
but the matter calls for much deeper treatment, which we recommend for
future research.
As final remarks, secure document search operation is a challenging re-
search area that features interesting problems, especially in the cloud setting
of outsourced data. It is a difficult problem as there is usually a trade off be-
tween either security and computational efficiency or security and accuracy.
While advanced encryption algorithms can improve accuracy in addition to
security, they are usually not amenable to fast implementations for big data
applications. In this thesis, we proposed scalable solutions, which provide
promising results for data sets of moderate size. Reconciling accuracy and
security with computational efficiency for even larger data sets is the subject
of future research.
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